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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Between the years 2000-2009, Zimbabwe experienced the worst socio-economic and 
political challenges in its post- independence history. The period saw a spiral downfall of 
the economy in the midst of an increasingly unstable political landscape. As a result of 
the deteriorating economic environment and a worsening human rights record, 
Zimbabwe’s traditional aid donors and trading partners from the West began to disengage 
from the country, withdrawing their commercial and political support. In the midst of 
Western isolation and sanctions, China increased its stakes in Zimbabwe. China does not 
interfere in her partners’ domestic affairs hence she snubbed Western calls to put pressure 
on the Zimbabwean government for political and economic reforms. Thus, China offered 
both economic and political support in various forms to the Mugabe administration. 
China provided Zimbabwe with several trading arrangements, aid, loans, investments and 
as well as diplomatic support in the United Nations Security Council during the crisis 
period. The study explains the post-2000 nature of China’s increased engagement with 
Zimbabwe and explores the economic and political effects resulting from this close 
interaction. The study revealed that China’s support was important to bail out the 
Zimbabwean government against Western sanctions despite failing short of preventing 
the deterioration of the country’s political and economic situation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 1.1. Background  
Since the end of the Cold War, China has been strengthening strategic partnerships with 
developing countries around the globe. It is however, China’s invigorated engagement 
with African countries that attracted profound interest among scholars, analysts and 
critics the world over. Much scholarly interest is on the geo-political and economic 
implications resulting from the increased Chinese presence on the continent. According 
to Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, China is “seemingly challenging the hegemonic 
positions” that have long been “monopolised by the United States of America (U.S), 
Britain and France in Africa.”1 China’s recent economic power has also been hugely 
affecting the economic interests of these major powers on the continent. Put in other 
words, China’s venturing into the sphere of influence of these former colonial powers 
threatens to undermine certain distinguished goals of the West2 such as “isolating rogue 
governments for failing to promote democracy, comply with international law…or 
respect human rights.”3    
 
China has often been heavily criticised particularly by Western powers for its willingness 
to support ‘despotic’ regimes in African countries such as Angola, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe.4 While the former U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice described 
                                                 
1 Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu: “Introduction: Africa and China in the Post Cold-War Era”, in 
Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds): Crouching Tiger and Hidden Dragon? China and Africa, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008, p. 3 
2 The West in this context refers to countries in the developed world which generally condemned 
Zimbabwe during the crisis period particularly the United States, Britain and France and others in the 
European Union. This also includes Australia, New Zealand as well as institutions such as the World Bank 
and The International Monetary Fund because of their demands for political and economic liberalization in 
their aid policies to developing countries. Also note that the word West or Western will particularly be used 
in the same context in this paper. 
3 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai: “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs, Volume. 85, No. 5, 
September/October 2005, p. 32  
4 Ian Taylor (a): “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”, African Affairs, Volume. 
107, Number 426, p. 63-87 
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Zimbabwe as one of the so called “outpost of tyranny,”5 China continues to partner with 
the country as an old friend and ally.6 From the late 1990s to date, Zimbabwe has been 
embroiled in the worst political and economic challenges of its post- independence 
history. Meanwhile, although the country has not yet fully recovered from the troubles of 
a remarkable political and economic slide, major economic problems such as inflation 
and commodity shortages have subsided with the dollarization of the economy since early 
2009. Political problems, however, still persist as the inclusive government remains 
divided over power sharing. In the last decade, Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political 
structures systematically deteriorated, invoking diverse opinions and responses from the 
country’s allies and critics around the world.  
 
Since the year 2000 until the formation of the inclusive government, Zimbabwe’s 
political landscape was characterized by internal violence and gross human rights 
violations. Violence was mainly noticeable in the land reform processes and increased 
tremendously in the aftermath of the 2008 disputed elections.  In addition, the country’s 
economy suffered a spiral downfall over the same period as shown by worsening macro-
economic indicators and continual deterioration of industrial output.7 It is reported that 
between 2000 and 2008, Zimbabwe’s national economy contracted by as much as 40 per 
cent, as inflation rose from about 25 percent in 1997 to 231 million per cent in July 
2008.8 Foreign direct investment dwindled from US$400 million in 1998 to less than 
US$30 million in 2008 while unemployment rose to more than 90 per cent by July 2008.9 
Severe shortages of foreign currency, fuel, and other basic supplies from the formal 
market further strained the country’s economy.  
 
                                                 
5 This phrase was used by the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice to refer to a list of six 
countries deemed to be most repressive. These include Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and 
Myanmar. Newzimbabwe.com: “Condoleezza Rice says Zimbabwe ‘outpost of tyranny’’ Available Online 
at http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/powell18.12161.html  . 
6 Mark Palmer: Breaking the real axis of evil: how to oust the world’s last dictators by 2025, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, United States of America, 2005,p. 298; Lindsay Hilsum: “Re -enter the 
Dragon: China’s New Mission in Africa”, Review of African Political Economy , Volume 32, No. 104, 
(June-September 2005), p 423 
7 Ibid, p. 5 
8 Steve. H. Hanke: “R.I.P. Zimbabwe Dollar,” CATO Institute,  Available Online at 
http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe 
9 Ibid 
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The general decline of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic structures also resulted to a tragic 
health crisis which resulted in the closure of major referral hospitals and the collapse of 
the education system which witnessed the closure of most public schools for long periods 
in 2008.10 These events, patterns and the recurrence of a cycle of poverty, violence and 
repression describe what has generally been referred to as the ‘Zimbabwean crisis.’ It was 
this situation that greatly led to the large scale migration of the country’s working class 
population into neighbouring countries particularly Botswana and South Africa, with 
some going as far as the United Kingdom, Australia and other countries across the globe. 
 
In response to the escalating violence, human rights violations and political repression in 
Zimbabwe, motions of isolating President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) government were raised among most Western governments 
with Britain and the United States of America leading this campaign.  Suggestions on 
suspending Zimbabwe from major international institutions such as the United Nations 
(UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank as well as the 
Commonwealth were also raised.11 The U.S Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy 
and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA)12 in December 2001 to push for political and 
economic reforms in Zimbabwe.13 In the same pattern, the European Union imposed 
targeted sanctions in 2002, as the Commonwealth battled over the decision to suspend 
Zimbabwe’s membership, effectively paralyzing the country’s economy.14  
 
Against this background, China sturdily stood with the Zimbabwean government and 
continued to partner with the regime despite Western opposition and chastisement. China 
supplied Zimbabwe with generous and unconditional aid, replacing rigorous IMF and 
World Bank loans. Its engagement with Zimbabwe in terms of bilateral trade and 
                                                 
10 Lauren Ploch: “Zimbabwe,” Congressional research Service Report, April 1, 2009, p. 7  
11 The International Crisis Group: All Back and No Bite? The International Response to Zimbabwe’s Crisis , 
International Crisis Group Africa Report Number 40, 25 January 2002, p. 14 
12 According to the International Crisis Group, ZIDERA was an approach that included incentives for a free 
and fair election and economic development. It also allowed the US to impose targeted sanctions against 
key ZANU PF officials. 
13 The International Crisis Group: Op cit, p. 16 
14 Percyslage Chigora: “On the Crossroads: Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy and the West”, Journal of 
Sustainable Development in Africa, Volume 9, No. 1 2007, p. 179 
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investment had already reached US$191 million by 2002.15 Its capital has been mainly 
directed into mining, electricity generation, infrastructural construction, farming, 
irrigation as well as other sectors that had been abandoned by traditional Western 
investors.16  
 
Recent studies on China-Africa relations largely dwell on the general overview of 
China’s involvement in Zimbabwe without sufficiently engaging the rationale for China’s 
current, more embedded interest in the country despite its unpleasant economic and 
political circumstances. The political and economic implications of this renewed 
engagement have not been adequately explored. Hence, China’s engagement with 
Zimbabwe in the context of the recent crisis needs to be explored to establish the 
economic and political implications of this renewed relationship.  
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
Since the turn of the millennium, China has displayed a refreshed interest to relate with 
Zimbabwe in direct contrast to the Western disengagement from the country. In the midst 
of a declining economy and an increasingly volatile political environment, the West 
began to withdraw their support and resources from Zimbabwe to show their displeasure 
with President Mugabe’s policies. On the contrary, China increased its involvement in the 
country through copious diplomatic, financial and military assistance.17 The current 
Chinese engagement in Zimbabwe is grounded on the premises of a close historical 
relationship described by Zimbabwean officials as an “all-weather friend.”18 The use of 
                                                 
15 Internationalist Communist Tendency: “The Zimbabwean Crisis and Chinese Imperialism in Africa,” 
Quarterly Journal of the Communist Workers’ Organisation, Revolutionary Perspectives No. 39, August 
2006, Available Online at http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2008-06-01/the-zimbabwe-crisis -and-chinese-
imperialism-in-africa  
16 Schwersensky S: “Harare’s ‘Look East’ Policy now focuses on China” in le Pere G (edr): China in 
Africa: A Mercantilist Predator or Partner in Development, The Institute of Global Dialogue, Midrand, 
2007, p. 23 
17 Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin: “China’s influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,” 
Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 1916, February 22, 2006, p. 6 
18 ‘All-weather friend’, quoted in the words of  former Zimbabwe Speaker of Parliament Emmerson 
Munangagwa when he said, “with all-weather friends like the Peoples Republic of China…Zimbabwe will 
never go wrong” see Paul Mooney: China’s Africa Safari, YaleGlobal 3 January 2005; Chibuzo N. Nwoke: 
China and Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of a New Model of South-South Cooperation, Paper 
presented at the 12th EADI General Conference  on Global Governance for Sustainable Development, 
Geneva, June 2008, p. 17 
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such language implies a brotherly relationship that would result in positive economic and 
political gains for both countries. For the Zimbabwean government, close interaction with 
China envisages a relationship that would be instrumental for stabilising the country’s 
economy.  
 
This study assumes that it was the West’s withdrawal from Zimbabwe which prompted 
the Zimbabwean government to seek renewed relations with China. At the same time, it 
was perhaps the pulling out by the West from Zimbabwe which presented China with an 
opportunity to re-establish its relationship with an old ally.  
 
1.3. Aim 
The study seeks to explore and evaluate the post-2000 renewed relationship between 
China and Zimbabwe. It seeks to understand China’s interests to engage Zimbabwe in the 
wake of a highly unstable political and economic environment snubbed by the West. It is 
to examine the nature of the recent China-Zimbabwe relations in terms of aid, 
investments and diplomatic political support to the Zimbabwean government. Further, the 
study intends to explore the local expectations and responses by the Zimbabwean elites, 
the business community and the general population to escalating China’s involvement in 
the country. The research aims to evaluate the costs and benefits of this engagement and 
the impact it had on Zimbabwe’s political and economic landscape. The overall aim of 
this study is to establish opportunities and challenges for Zimbabwe arising from re-
establishing strong relations with China in the context of a collapsing economy and 
deteriorating social and political environment. The study thus, seeks to evaluate the 
extent of China’s contribution in ameliorating Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political 
problems during the crisis period. 
 
1.4. Research Questions  
 
The study will be guided by the following main research question: 
What is the significance of China to Zimbabwe’s economic and political landscape 
during the crisis period (2000-2009) and the implications thereof on Zimbabwe’s future? 
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In addition it will be guided and informed by the following sub questions: What are the 
basic tenets that underline the post-2000 Chinese engagement with Zimbabwe and Africa 
in general? What difference did the enhanced relationship with China make to 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis after isolation by the traditional Western 
partners? To what extend did China help to stabilise Zimbabwe’s economy after the 
withdrawal of the West. What are the local perceptions and responses to China’s 
increased presence in Zimbabwe? What is the likely future outcome of this relationship 
and what are the lessons that can be drawn? 
 
1.5. Rationale 
Contemporary China-Africa relations have attracted considerable scholarly interest.19 
Studies of China’s foreign policy towards Africa mainly focus on its thirsty for the 
region’s natural resources particularly oil in Angola, Nigeria and Sudan as well as other 
resources endowments on the continent.20 While some scholars have written on China’s 
support on the Zimbabwean government in the face of its deteriorating human rights 
record,21 few have taken notice of the recent China’s intensive ties with the country.  As 
one of the important centres of power in the international system, there has been 
concerted calls for China to adhere to and assume international responsibility with regard 
to cherished principles, norms and values such as good governance, human rights and the 
rule of law. 22 In its interactions with other states however, China strongly adheres to 
principles of sovereignty and non- interference in domestic affairs of its partners.23 
Zimbabwe is a case of collision between China’s non- intervention policy and the 
international normative expectations on the Chinese government. The understanding of 
                                                 
19 Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu: Op cit, p. 4 
20 Lindsay Hils um: “Re-enter the Dragon: China’s New Mission in Africa”, Review of African Political 
Economy , Volume 32, No. 104, (June-September 2005), David Zweig and Bi Jianhai: “China’s Global 
Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs, Volume. 85, No. 5, September/October 2005 
21 Ian Taylor (a): “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”, African Affairs, Volume. 
107, Number 426, p. 63-87, Sven Schwersensky: “Harare’s ‘Look East’ policy now Focuses on China” in 
Garth Le Pere (editor): China In Africa, A Mercantilist Predator or Partner in Development?, Institute of 
Global dialogue, Midrand South Africa, 2007 
22 Ilana Botha: China in Africa: Friend or Foe? China’s Contemporary Political and Economic Relations 
with Africa, University of Stellenbosch, 2006, p. 3 
23 Chris Alden C and Philip Alves: “History and Identity in the Construction of China’s Africa Policy,” 
Review of African Political Economy, ROAPE Publications LTD , Volume 35, No, 115, p.  43 
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how China’s policy and these international calls played out during the Zimbabwean crisis 
is of particular importance to this study. The collision of these factors, juxtaposed with a 
persistent economic downfall and growing repression in Zimbabwe underscores why 
exploring the close state of affairs between the two countries is significant during the 
time in question.  
 
This study helps to understand how the coalescence of external actors with different 
agendas and expectations can influence a country’s economic and political landscape. 
While there were different international actors present in Zimbabwe during the crisis 
period, this study focuses on China mainly because of its uncompromising stance to stand 
with the ZANU-PF government against the backdrop of Western isolation. China’s 
contribution through loans, investments, trade commitments and its unwavering 
diplomatic support in the United Nations and other multilateral forums will form the 
basis of this study. In this regard, the study will contribute to policy literature as it will 
shed more light on how external factors impacted the political and economic situation in 
Zimbabwe during the crisis period. In whole, this study significantly contributes to the 
existing literature on China-Africa relations, and more specifically to the literature on 
China’s direct engagements with Zimbabwe. 
 
1.6. Theoretical Framewo rk 
The study aims to discuss the post-2000 China - Zimbabwe relations under the prism of 
the realist theory. Realism is one of the dominant theories under which international 
relations are studied and states’ behaviour in relation to others can be analysed. Realists, 
such as Hans Morgenthau, Joseph Nye, and John Mearsheimer converge on the notion 
that states are the main actors in the international system whose behaviour and affairs are 
guided by the ultimate goal of survival. 24 Realists perceive the international system as 
anarchic.25 However, this does not mean the existence of chaos and perpetual conflict, but 
it depicts that there is no permanent or universal authority in the international system that 
                                                 
24 John Mearsheimer J: “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Volume. 
19, No. 3, (Winter, 1994-1995), p. 5-49, Joseph S. Nye JR: “Review: Neorealism and Neoliberalism”, 
World Politics, Volume. 40, No. 2, January, 1988, p.243, Hans Morgenthau: “Realism and the Study of 
International Politics, Sixtieth Anniversary, 1934-1994,” Social Research, Winter, 1994 
25 John Mearsheimer J: Op cit,, 16 
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regulates states’ behaviour.26 There is also the existence of mutual suspicion in world 
politics, meaning that states’ intentions and expectations are never fully disclosed to their 
counterparts hence states neither have permanent friends nor permanent enemies. 
Furthermore, state action and behaviour is mostly stirred by national interests, which in 
many cases override certain internationally applauded values and norms such as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 27 Since international relations is dynamic, 
state interests also change from time to time as they modify their policies and transform 
their means of engagement to adjust to the changing nature of  the international system. 
 
From a closer look on the patterns and trends of the present Chinese engagement in 
Zimbabwe, one can understand that despite recent issues of globalization and increased 
interdependence amongst states, China-Zimbabwe relations are firmly grounded in the 
realist school of thought. The Zimbabwean crisis presented what can be described as a 
chaotic coalescence of international values, norms and interests, as different states and 
other actors sought to influence economic and political outcomes in the country. The 
coalescence of various diverging interests thus, represents the anarchic nature of the 
international system. As realists claim, there is no higher and sovereign authority in the 
international system to regulate states’ behaviour.28 Despite efforts by China to advance 
some moral values of cooperation, the rationale behind China’s actions and behaviour in 
its engagement with other states particularly in Africa seems to be taking the realist 
pattern. During the crisis period, issues of democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
became the main reference of Western criticism of the Zimbabwean government.29 China 
however, did not consider these values in its relationship with Zimbabwe. Instead, China 
adopted a “hands off” approach on the country’s governance issues.30  
 
                                                 
26 Lo cit 
27 Joseph S. Nye Jnr: Op cit, p. 243 
28 Charles Reynolds: The World of States: An Introduction to Explanation and Theory, Edward Elgar 
Publishing company, England, 1992, p. 53 
29 Lloyd Sachickonye: Crouching Tiger, Hidden Agenda? Zimbabwe-China Relations in Kweku Ampiah 
and Sanusha Naidu (eds): Op cit, p.125 
30 Yong Deng: “The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations”, The China 
Quarterly 1998, p. 311 
9 
 
Although China regards itself as a growing democracy, 31 its behaviour in contemporary 
world politics shows that it is  not devoted to any higher international ideological interests 
and values such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Through the “Go 
global” policy, 32 China espouses a system of non-alignment and non- interference in 
domestic affairs of its partners guided by its own national interest and unprecedented 
pursuit for resources.33 In exchange for access to oil and other raw materials to fuel its 
booming economy, Beijing intents to boost its bilateral relations with resource rich states, 
striking deals with African states that have been labelled by the West as ‘rogue states’ 
which include Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe.34 Denis Tull put it clear when he argued 
that China has been able to invest and do business with these countries despite wide 
criticisms by the West for bad governance and gross human rights violations.35 
 
Realists also claim that states’ behaviour in the international system is guided by their 
national interests. At the root of this idea of national interest is the realist principle of 
state security and national survival. 36 With increasing economic hardships and rising 
political and economic isolation by traditional partners from the West, political survival 
became a priority for President Mugabe’s government. In this case, the Zimbabwean 
government adopted a self-help approach by re-engaging its old ally for both financial 
and political support.  
 
The Zimbabwean government undoubtedly employed various methods including 
repression for its own survival. For instance, through the clean-up campaign of “illegal” 
settlements and informal markets, an exercise dubbed ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ of 
                                                 
31Joseph Miller: ‘Zimbabwe and China: Implications of the “Look East” and the “non-interference” 
policies,’ China Elections and Governance, July 17, 2008, Available Online at 
http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18508 
32 “Go global” policy: According to China Business Services, this policy was adopted in 2000 to engage 
various countries of the world to sources resources and markets for China’s burgeoning economy. 
33 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai: “China’s global Hunt for Energy”, The Council of Foreign Relations, 
October 2005,Available online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61017/david-zweig-and-b i-
jianhai/chinas-global-hunt-for-energy  
34 Ibid 
35 Tull D. M: “China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences,” in The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Volume. 44, No. 3, 2006, p. 460 
36 Evans G and Newham J: The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books, England 
1998, p. 345 
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May 2005, a large number of urban dwellers in Zimbabwe were sacrificed for state 
survival as their increased activism was suspected to be a big threat to the government’s 
popularity, particularly in the country’s urban areas.37 This issue was heavily criticised by 
the then U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, invoking Zimbabwe’s suspension 
from United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on grounds of gross human rights 
violations. China and Russia however, opposed any discussion of the subject in the UN 
Security Council on the grounds that it would amount to meddling with Zimbabwe's 
internal affairs.38 Zimbabwean prominent scholars such as Lloyd Sachikonye, John 
Makumbe and Eldred Masunungure agreed on the view that the clean-up campaign was 
motivated by the government’s quest to create space for Chinese businesses in 
Zimbabwe’s urban centres.39 This argument was raised probably because the clean-up 
campaign mainly targeted informal traders and small enterprises in urban areas. In this 
regard the United Nations which is probably the highest world authority in checking 
states’ behaviour in the international system could not control China’s position over 
Zimbabwe.  
 
Realism however, falls short in explaining the current China-Zimbabwe relations in the 
sense that it fails to recognize the importance of and the role played by non-state actors 
during the Zimbabwean crisis. By viewing states as unitary actors in international 
relations, realism seem to play down the role played by inter-governmental organisations 
such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Commonwealth among others. 
Although China, with the cooperation of Russia managed to challenge other members in 
the UN Security Council on the Zimbabwean issue, the pressure and tension involved in 
handling Zimbabwe in the world’s governing body should not be undermined. Also, the 
pressure put by the European Union through sanctions had a huge impact in weakening 
                                                 
37 Zimbabwe Election Support Network: Report on the Zimbabwe 29 March Harmonised Election and 
June-27 Presidential Run-off, Advanced Copy, August 2008, p. 16 
38 Shinn D: China’s Relations with Zimbabwe, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, African 
Voices, Global Choices: Impact on Human Rights, Concept Paper presented at Elliot School of 
International Affairs, George Washington University, March 15, 2008 
39 Norwegian Refuge Council Report: “Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?” Africa 
Report, No. 97, August 2005, Available Online at 
http://www.nrc.ch/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FBFD607BE0680EF4802570B7005A5854/$file/
097_zimbabwe_s_operation_murambatsvina_the_tipping_point.pdf 
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the Zimbabwean economy. Non-governmental organisations particularly those engaged 
in human rights advocacy also played their part as they pilled more weight on the 
Zimbabwean government by constantly criticising its handling of human rights issues 
through the local and international media. 
 
Realism’s over emphasis on the pursuit of national interest in terms of power negates the 
cooperative nature of states in situations of expected mutual gain. The theory perceives 
international economic cooperation as a “zero-sum game”, in which “the gain of one 
party necessitates a loss for the other party.”40 In its engagement with African states 
including Zimbabwe, China has not been the sole beneficiary of these relationships. 
Some African states, among others, Angola and Ethiopia have been benefiting to a large 
extent through investments and infrastructural development projects such as bridges, 
dams, roads supported by the Chinese government and private corporations which are 
expanding their business on the continent.41 More recently, China has been interacting 
with different countries despite poor record on democracy for development purposes. 
This is popularized through the benchmarks of “peace, cooperation and development” as 
outlined by President Hu Jintao at the inauguration of the Third Summit of the Forum for 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006.42    
  
Despite the above criticisms of realism, it however, has to be stated that realists do not 
say that cooperation never exists in inter-state relations. Joseph Grieco, for example 
asserts that cooperation between states is a way to maximise each individual state’s 
security and preferences.43 It therefore follows that, holding other factors constant, 
convergent state preferences beget inter-state cooperation while divergent preferences 
usually generate interstate conflict. For both Zimbabwe and China, principles of state 
                                                 
40 Robert Gilpin: The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987, p. 17 
41 Vivien Foster, William Butterfield et-al: ‘Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure 
Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa’, Executive Summary, The World Bank, Available Online at, 
siteresources.worldbank.org/.../BB_Final_Exec_summary_English_July08_Wo-Embg.pdf    
42 Hu Jinato as quoted in Sandvand H: Friends and Interest. A Comparison of Chinese and Nordic Aid to 
Tanzania, Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, Norwegian 
University of Life Sciences, Norway, 2008, p. 1 
43 Joseph Grieco 1988, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organisations Volume 42, Number 3, p. 485-507  
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sovereignty, self determination and the protection of territorial integrity are at the core of 
two countries’ bilateral relations. Both states resolutely support the concept of sovereign 
independence and non- interference in other states’ domestic affairs. These shared 
principles can therefore, be regarded as the glue that kept these countries together for a 
long time despite international criticism on normative values of good governance and 
human rights. On this basis, values such as political and economic liberalisation, the rule 
of law, democracy and good governance are only important insofar as they are in 
harmony with the cherished national and international interests and goals of the state. In 
contrast, recent divergent interests and principles of governance have seen the 
deterioration of relations between Zimbabwe and the West.  
 
Realist also support that state behaviour in the international system is strongly determined 
and / or limited by their power,44 perceptions 45 and preferences of both their enemies 
(perceived or real) and their allies (both existing and prospective).46 This therefore means 
that what states do (their actions) is controlled by their power, what the international 
system is offering and what they can get from it in order to satisfy their interests. In this 
regard, the current behaviour of both China and Zimbabwe is determined not only by 
mutual interests but also by what they can get from each other as well as from other state 
actors in the international system. In this understanding, this study effectively adopts 
realism as the strongest theory in explaining the current China-Zimbabwe relations. 
 
1.7. Literature Review 
China’s invigorated engagement in Africa since the beginning of the 1990s attracted 
extensive academic and scholarly interest. Contemporary literature on China-Africa 
relations present different views regarding China’s increased involvement on the 
continent. This section therefore discusses these contemporary views on China’s 
                                                 
44 State power in this context is defined in terms of the material capabilities of the states and their capacity 
to convert their material resources into political power. Elements of power are usually identified in military, 
geographical and economic advantages that enable states to make other states do what they would 
otherwise not do. For more explanation of state power, see Lewis. W Snider: “Identifying the Elements of 
State Power, Where do we Begin?” Comparative Political Studies, Volume 20, No. 3, 1987, p. 314-356 
45 The way in which a state is perceived by others in the international system determines how other states 
will react towards it and hence affecting what it may or may not get from them. 
46 Joseph Greico: Op cit, p. 493 
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increased interest in the region and goes on to establish the relevance of these various 
perspectives to the study of the current China-Zimbabwe relations. 
 
A large contingent of scholars share similar views with regard to the driving interests of 
the refreshed Chinese engagement with Africa. Ian Taylor, Garth Shelton, Philip Alves 
and Peter Draper among others concur that the current China-Africa relations are largely 
commercial.47 Both Shelton and Taylor argue that China’s policy in Africa is centred on 
increased economic interaction tiered on three main objectives which are China’s 
growing demand for energy (oil); Africa’s raw materials and natural resources; and 
Africa’s potential as a market for China’s finished products.48  
 
Others, for example Chris Alden and Stephanie Giry attributed this relationship to the 
increased need for diplomatic support in multilateral forums by both parties. Chris Alden 
asserts that most of China’s contact in Africa has been economic and diplomatic, largely 
targeting governments and elites in different countries.49 On the same note, Stephanie 
Giry puts it clearly when he presented China as “trying to buy the hearts and minds of 
African leaders as part of its broader strategy to acquire allies in developing countries so 
as to augment its soft power internationally.”50 Since most African countries have denied 
recognition of the Taiwan Republic, this political support is instrumental for China in its 
‘One-China’ policy of integrating Taiwan administration into mainland China.51 
 
In the light of the above explanations of the perceived drivers of China in Africa, there 
exist intriguing interests and anxieties about the spreading shadow of China on the 
                                                 
47 Ian Taylor: “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”, African Affairs, Volume, 107, 
Number 426, 2008, Garth Shelton and  Paruk F: 4 China-Africa Relations, The Evolution of China-Africa 
Relations, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, A Strategic Opportunity, Monograph No 156, 
December 2008,  Philip Alves and Peter Draper: China’s Growing Role in Africa in lee Pere G (edt): China 
in Africa: A Mercantilist Predator or Partner in Development, The Institute of Global Dialogue, Midrand, 
2007 
48 Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu: Op Cit, p. 5 
49 Chris Alden: China in Africa, Zed Books, London, 2007, p.5-15 
50 Stephanie Giry: “China’s Africa Strategy – Out of Beijing”, The Republic, November 5, 2004, p. 19-23  
51 Ibid 
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continent. The rising interests of China on the African region, a country generally 
considered as a non-traditional foreign power on the continent therefore generated two 
polarising sets of scholarly views. While some concentrate on the positive postulations, 
others, troubled by this trend, have chosen to dwell much on the perceived negative 
perspectives of China’s invigorated interest on the continent. 
 
In the light of the above, Debora Brautigam52, Kwesi Kwaa Prah53, David Shinn and 
Joshua Eisenman54 among others view the increased China-Africa relations more 
positively. These scholars collectively perceive that Africa has a lot to benefit from 
China’s commercial interest in the region. In the same veil, Daniel Large regards China 
as a catalyst for Africa’s development with a new level of improved livelihoods that had 
not been known in the continent for decades.55 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, in 
their study in the horn of Africa concluded that “China’s economic assistance and 
investment contribute to the betterment of the Horn of Africa.”56 On the same stratum, 
other scholars share the position that Africa tends to benefit from its close interaction 
with China mostly in terms of small scale trading. Analysing China’s contribution on 
micro- level business enterprises, Chris Alden found that there are examples of African 
entrepreneurs in small and medium businesses who have benefited immensely from 
Chinese investments particularly through “the growth of informal and formal linkages 
with Chinese…business networks outside government sponsorship.”57 
                                                 
52 Deborah Brautigam: “Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?” Council on Foreign Relations, Online 
Debate, Last updated on 20 February 2007, Accessible at,  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12622/is_chinese_investment_good_for_africa.html 
53 Kwesi Kwaa Prah: China and Africa: Defining a Relationship, Dialogue, Society for International 
Development, 2007, 
54 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman: Dueling Priorities for Beijing in the horn of Africa, Association for 
the Asian Research, The Jamestown Foundation Brief, October 2005 
55 Daniel Large: China’s role in the mediation and Resolution of conflict in Africa, Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, the OSLO Forum of Mediators, OSLO 2008, Also see Garth le Pere and Garth Shelton: China, 
Africa and South Africa: South-South Cooperation in a Global Era, Institute for Global Dialogue, 
Johannesburg, 2007, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks: African Perspectives in China in Africa, Oxford, 
Fahamu, 2006, Giles Mohan and Marcus Power: “New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese 
Engagement,” Review of African Political Economy , Volume. 35, No. 115 (Special Issue), March 2008 
56 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman: Op cit, p. 5 
57 Chris Alden: “China-Africa Relations: the end of the beginning” in Peter Draper and Garth le Pere (eds): 
Enter the Dragon: Towards a free trade engagement between China and the Southern African Customs 
Union, Institute for Global Dialogue and the South African Institute for International Relations, 
Johannesburg, 2005, p. 143 
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Furthermore, Anthony Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch argue that, “China’s engagement 
with Africa today is less motivated by ideological considerations but based on a 
commercial agenda that aims to sustain rapid industrialisation and economic growth 
rates.”58 This is in agreement with Alden’s postulation that Chinese investments give 
Africa an opportunity to benefit especially in skills and technology transfer.59 Baah and 
Jauch share the same perspective as they argue that Africa stand to benefit more from 
China’s involvement in the sense that Chinese relations with the continent are coupled 
with aid, debt relief, scholarships, training and provision of technical specialists to 
African countries.60 China’s aid in Africa has been very crucial for development and in 
cushioning certain sections of the continent’s populations from abject poverty. In the 
same vein, it should also be noted that Chinese aid in Africa does not carry stringent 
conditionalities especially on governance and economic liberalisation usually demanded 
by the Breton Woods institutions, that is, the IMF and the World Bank lending systems. 
China, rather prefers the ‘no-strings attached’ approach in its engagement with African 
states.61   
 
Some scholars have however, adopted a more hostile stance on the recent China-Africa 
relations. Among others, Margaret C. Lee, Ian Taylor, and Adama Gaye analyse China’s 
commercial ascendency in Africa as a threat with an imperialist agenda.62 In Particular, 
Adama Gaye argues that China is “a new imperial power with a colonialist project who 
will pretend to be a saviour to Africa.”63 In relation to this, analysts such as Kweku 
Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, agree with a host of other scholars who argue that Beijing’s 
                                                 
58 Anthony Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch: Increasing Africa’s benefits from China: Developing a strategic 
approach, Emerging Powers in Africa Watch, Pambazuka News, Issue 439, June, 2009. 
59 Chris Alden: China in Africa: Op Cit , p. 6 
60 Anthony Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch: Op cit 
61 Debora Brautigam: Op cit. 
62 Margaret C. Lee: “The 21st Scramble for Africa”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Volume. 24, 
No. 3, 2006, p. 303-330; Ian Taylor: “Beijing’s Arms and Oil Interests in Africa”, China Brief, Vo lume. 5, 
No 21, October 2005; Adama Gaye: “ Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa,” Discussion Published by 
the Council on Foreign Relations, February 20, 2007, Available Online 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12622/is_chinese_investment_good_for_africa.html  
63 Adama Gaye: Op cit  
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re-emergence in Africa “evokes visions of the ‘Second Scramble’, resulting in yet 
another impending round of the foreign plunder of Africa’s natural resources.”64  
 
In addition, scholars have also been sceptic about China’s silence on authoritarian 
governance in Africa. David Shinn asserts that, while concealing its predatory instincts, 
China has established partnerships mainly with regimes that have been linked with gross 
human rights abuses in Africa.65  In support of this view, Shinn cited Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Zimbabwe as examples in which 
Chinese engagement helped to promote the interests of ‘repressive’ governments.66 
 
Scholars have also levelled criticism against China for the ‘sometimes shady way’ in 
which it conducts its affairs in Africa especially in its political interactions. The principal 
tenets of China’s foreign policy towards Africa are non- interference in the internal affairs 
of other states and the respect for state sovereignty. 67 These principles therefore seem to 
justify China’s policies of not attaching any political conditionalities in its African 
engagements. In this regard, Meine Pieter van Dijk asserts that China does not put 
significant value in principles such as democracy, transparency and human rights.68 This 
is in agreement with Ian Taylor who pointed out that China’s non- interference stance 
allows it to engage with more ‘despotic’ regimes in Africa.69 In light of these arguments, 
Ampiah and Naidu affirm that the relationship between China and certain African 
governments has been deleterious to achieving good governance and democratic state 
building on the continent.70 
 
                                                 
64 Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu: Op Cit, p. 5; Also see The Economist articles, Africa and China: 
Wrong Model, Right Continent, October 28, 2006, and China in Africa: Never Too Late to Scramble , 
November 3, 2006 
65 The Economist: Op cit 
66 David Shinn: Op cit 
67Ian Taylor: China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, Routledge Taylor and Francis, London, 
2006, p. 14  
68 Meine Pieter van Dijk: The New Presents on China in Africa, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 
2009, p. 17 
69 Ian Taylor: “The ‘all-weather friend’? Sino-Africa Interaction in the 21st century” in Ian Taylor and Paul 
Williams (eds): Africa in International Politics, External Involvement in the Continent, Routledge, London, 
2004.p. 94 
70 Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu: Op Cit, p. 4 
17 
 
It has also been argued that China’s involvement in Africa is largely self-serving. Giles 
Mohan and Marcus Power pointed out that China has been using investment and aid 
packages to secure access to natural resources in Africa for its own growing economy.71 
Michele Chan-Fishel and Roxanne Lawson asserted that since 2000, China has been 
hugely investing in Africa’s extractive industry as part of its objective to source for 
mineral resources to feed its bourgeoning economy. 72 Accordingly, Lloyd Sachikonye is 
of the view that China’s appetite for natural resources explains its increased engagement 
in Zimbabwe.73  
 
In addition, Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin argued that China’s hunger for global 
political and economic influence is a key driver for its more imbedded involvement in 
Africa especially in those countries struggling with political instability. 74 They further 
emphasized that the amount of international attention given to cases such as Sudan and 
Zimbabwe provides China with an opportunity to flex its political power in those 
countries and to stamp its authority in major international decision making bodies such 
as the United Nations.75 In support of this, Faycal EL-Alami argues that “as a rising 
power, China is keen on gathering political influence in Africa.”76 Despite criticisms by 
the West and by organisations such as the United Nations, China continues to offer its 
relentless support to these countries in the multilateral arena. 
 
In general, the above discussion portends that China’s recent engagement with Africa is, 
on one hand, mutually beneficial, innovative and developmental, while on the other 
hand it is exploitative, extractive, destructive and providing a way of perpetuating 
Africa’s underdevelopment.77 At this point, it is important to note that the foregoing 
                                                 
71 Giles Mohan and Marcus Power: Op Cit, p. 29 
72 Michele Chan-Fishel and Roxanne Lawson: “Quid Pro Quo? China’s Investment- for-Resource Swaps in 
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arguments and postulations generally apply to China’s conduct in most of the African 
content in the sense that China’s principle, behaviour and interactions have been almost 
consistent across the whole spectrum of states that it has been dealing with.  As shown 
by many scholars, China-Africa relations have been vast and extensive. Research on 
China’s engagement with Zimbabwe has however, been sparse. Although scholars such 
Ian Taylor; Denis Tull; Chris Alden; Raphael Kaplinsky and others have touched on the 
country in their studies on China’s interactions in Southern Africa, their studies do not 
explicitly speak of China-Zimbabwe relations in the context of the recent Zimbabwean 
crisis. As a result, their conclusions are based on a generally paltry overview of China’s 
involvement in the country over a vast period of time. This study therefore, intends to 
understand the nature and implications of China’s engagement with Zimbabwe during 
the crisis period. 
 
 1.8. Methodology 
This study adopts a qualitative research methodology in both data collection and analysis. 
Qualitative research is about exploring issues, understanding phenomena and answering 
questions. In this case, the study seeks to understand the relations between China and 
Zimbabwe by exploring various issues of interaction between the two countries in an 
attempt to find answers for the above mentioned questions.  The research also makes 
analysis of various sources of unstructured information which ranges from official public 
statements by representatives of the two countries’ governments, media clips, reports and 
trade documents. These form the basic features of qualitative research, hence it has been 
chosen as the best approach for this study 
 
 
The study mainly relies on the content analysis research method. This involved taking 
account of routine public statements (throughout the crisis period) by various government 
officials and other stakeholders about the nature of the relationship between the two 
countries. Thus the research makes a collection of various media reports released by 
different media outlets including newspaper articles, electronic media reports and 
government gazettes. From these sources, official statements from both Zimbabwean and 
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Chinese government authorities on the relations between the two countries are extracted. 
Such statements are considered to be highly reflective of basic principles and benchmarks 
on which China-Zimbabwe relations are founded. The research also compiles a list of 
various bilateral agreements reached between the two countries during the Zimbabwean 
crisis period. This information is coded into different but corresponding columns showing 
the year, type and specifics of particular agreements presented in a table format. From a 
critical review of the various agreements signed between the two countries, inferences 
can be made to ascertain the scope of China’s involvement in Zimbabwe during the crisis 
period. 
 
 Furthermore, the research makes use of the information on Chinese grants to Zimbabwe 
obtained from the Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Finance over the period under review. Again, 
this information is coded to indicate the values and purpose of the grants. In addition, the 
study records the various Chinese projects in Zimbabwe, indicating the sectors and status 
of each project. On this note, the research also utilised information from a previous 
related study by the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development 
(AFRODAD): A critical assessment of Chinese development assistance in Africa: The 
case of Zimbabwe.  In this regard, the study explores variations and changes resulting 
from China’s engagement in the key sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. Sectors such 
as agriculture, mining, energy, manufacturing, transport and other important departments 
such as trade, export production and infrastructural development were critical in this 
analysis. The research also makes use of trade data from the World Trade Atlas to 
analyse trade interactions between China and Zimbabwe over the crisis period. The study 
therefore, critically reviews the information on Chinese investment projects and trade 
figures and how these changed with increased Chinese involvement in the country during 
the crisis period. This helped to answer the question on the level and nature of China’s 
contribution to the Zimbabwean economy in the absence of the country’s traditional 
Western partners. From this evaluation, one can ascertain the extent to which China 
influenced the political and economic landscape of Zimbabwe in the period under review. 
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In order to understand Zimbabwean perspectives of China’s increased engagement in the 
country, comments and documented opinions of government officials, opposition 
members, academics, civil society representatives as well as members of the community 
given in various settings including in a range of of media outlets are also incorporated in 
this study. In this regard, the study also made use of the finding or a survey conducted by 
Charity Manyeruke titled, “The Impacts of Chinese Products on Zimbabwean Women” 
which investigated the different perspectives of women in Harare on the influx of 
Chinese products in the city’s markets. 
 
This study also made use of the extensive existing literature on China-Africa relations, 
including books, book chapters and journal articles, reports of investigative panels and 
groups working on China Africa relations such as Fahamu/Pambazuka, Kubatana, Cato 
Institute, the Jamestown Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations and others.  
 
The study also employed the process tracing method to draw possible casual linkages 
between China’s increased engagement in Zimbabwe and the outcomes and experiences 
in Zimbabwe’s economic and political landscape.  
 
1.9. Research limitations  
Since the  study was an attempt to assess the impacts of China’s involvement in 
Zimbabwe, the main difficulty was to explicitly quantify such effects over a period of a 
decade.  This was due to the complexity of the China-Zimbabwe relationship and the 
difficulty in accessing data on the values and the disbursement of China’s financial 
support to the Zimbabwean government. Moreover, information on China’s contribution 
to the Zimbabwean government was apparently regarded as confidential and not subject 
to public scrutiny. Given these difficulties, evidence was sought by assessing the different 
political and economic variables, identifying variations and explaining their implications 
to Zimbabwe’s economic and political affairs. Under the political variables, China’s 
influence in aspects such as the nature and levels of violence, the human rights record, 
regional as well as international diplomatic support to the Zimbabwean government were 
assessed in this study. For the economic variables, the study focused on the level of 
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inflation, market performances of the county, the demand and supply of local products 
vis-à-vis Chinese products in Zimbabwe.  
 
1.10. Outline of Study 
Chapter 2 presents the scene of the Zimbabwean crisis, discussing the causes of 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political downfall. The Chapter also outlines the nature of this 
crisis focusing on its elements. It goes on to discuss how external actors, that is, the 
United Sates of America, the European Union, China and the African Union and SADC 
responded to this major shift in Zimbabwe’s economic and political landscape.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the historical and contemporary relationship between China and 
Zimbabwe. The chapter traces and explains the various forms through which China has 
been supporting Zimbabwe. It discusses China’s aid, loans, investments and the various 
trade interactions with Zimbabwe during the crisis period. It also discusses the adoption 
of the ‘Look East’ policy by the Zimbabwean government to solicit Chinese support.  
 
In Chapter 4 the study focuses on the economic and political effects of China’s increased 
engagement with Zimbabwe addressing the costs and benefits imbedded in the 
partnership. The chapter goes on to explain the various local stakeholder perspectives and 
responses to escalating Chinese presence in Zimbabwe. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion of the study, giving a summary of the findings. It 
provides the lessons that can be drawn from the study and the possible future outcomes of 
China-Zimbabwe relations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 EXPLAINING THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS 
 
2.1. The Nature of the Zimbabwean Crisis 
Since the turn of the millennium, Zimbabwe witnessed a spiral socio-economic and 
political decline. The cumulative implosion of the country’s socio-economic and political 
structures which obtained in the country since the year 2000 subjected many 
Zimbabweans to desperate hardships, results of which are still present today. Thus the 
economic and political events that occurred during the crisis period in Zimbabwe are 
central to this study as they help to shed more light on the interactions between China and 
Zimbabwe in the same period. Zimbabwe’s precipitous fall from a regional ‘bread 
basket’ to a malnourished ‘basket case’ became a matter of concern not only to its 
African neighbours but also to the international community at large.78 The use of the 
phrase ‘international community’ in this context refers to the diverse set of actors and 
coalitions globally, including among others, policy-makers, scholars, commentators, 
international non-governmental organisations and journalists. It should also be noted that 
the use of the phrase in this study is often West-centric, notably owing to the power 
imbalance between the Western countries and the rest of the world in terms of norm-
building, control of international agencies and international policy-making practices.  
 
Referring to Zimbabwe’s fall, Terence Mashingaidze pointed out that, “The country 
ceased from being a net exporter of food to regional basket case.”79 Contrary to the great 
hope of success showed at independence and in the 1980s, Zimbabwe experienced a 
tragic fall to what the Diplomats’ Handbook describes as “one of Africa’s most notable 
stories of post-colonial failure.”80 This chapter sets out to discuss the nature of 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political meltdown, outlining the causes and the indicators of 
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the crisis. The chapter goes on to discuss the reactions by other countries to Zimbabwe’s 
economic and political failure, drawing out some expected political outcomes of the 
situation. 
 
During the early years of independence, Zimbabwe was one of the most promising 
African states. With plentiful natural resources, a bountiful and productive agricultural 
sector, a strong compliment of human capital, a solid and functional bureaucracy, the 
country was poised for success.81 Zimbabwe quickly developed socially and 
economically to become what Craig Richardson referred to as the ‘jewel’ of Africa.82 The 
new Harare government was embraced internationally,83 more so, by both sides of the 
Cold War bloc system despite its blatant inclination towards the communist group during 
the liberation struggle. The international community, including countries of the non-
aligned movement placed great faith in the new Zimbabwean state. The country also 
became a destination for huge international aid and capital investments from various parts 
of the world, for example, from China, the U.S, Britain and many other countries. The 
IMF and the World Bank also came in with enormous amounts of aid and support for 
reconstruction and development. With all this support, the country was moving towards 
becoming one of the powerful economies of Africa. 
 
Despite clear hopes of success and stability, Zimbabwe progressively degenerated into an 
economic and political crisis. The existing struggles by the inclusive government to 
revive the country’s economy and its administrative institutions present a clear picture of 
the gravity of the crisis. An important question at this point is: What exactly was the 
situation that is generally referred to as the ‘Zimbabwean Crisis’? It has to be 
acknowledged that various stakeholders interpreted the ‘Zimbabwean Crisis’ in different 
ways. Also, the ‘crisis’ manifested itself in a multiplicity of elements, events and 
experiences hence making it difficult to come up with one clear definition. Nevertheless, 
elements and episodes such as economic meltdown, land occupations, famine, violence, 
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political authoritarianism, health pandemics, basic commodity shortages, unprecedented 
exodus of skilled human resources, spiralling inflation, electoral disputes, and the recent 
political impasse can be used to explain the magnitude of this crisis.84 Combined, these 
elements created an explosive and exceptional ‘cocktail’ of tensions that the country 
experienced in both the domestic and international arena. In order to fully comprehend 
the elements of the Zimbabwean crisis however, one has to understand the background 
behind their causes as they resonate strongly with the problems that the country has been 
facing.   
  
2.2. Understanding the Causes of the Zimbabwean Crisis 
Although there are many explanations to the Zimbabwean crisis, its main causes can be 
classified into four closely intertwined categories. The different factors that contributed to 
the crisis are presented separately in the forthcoming discussion.  
 
2.2.1. Breakdown of the Social Contract 
Various scholars agree on the position that Zimbabwe’s problems started in the late 
1990s with most of them marking 1997 as the year in which the grim picture about 
Zimbabwe’s future became more visible.85 It was during this time that the country 
witnessed the development of high levels of social and political confrontations 
epitomized by widespread strikes and ruthless urban social conflicts largely attributed to 
the legacies of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) of the early 
1990s.86 According to Mario Zamponi, these disturbances inevitably led to the 
breakdown of the social contract between 1996 and 1998 and sowed the seeds for the 
country’s economic and political demise.87 The implementation of ESAP in Zimbabwe 
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had caused huge cuts in labour expenditure of both private and public enterprises, leading 
to loss of jobs for large numbers of the urban working population. The few who remained 
at work places had their wages and salaries hugely reduced to the extent that they could 
not cope with the ever- increasing costs of living. As a result, urban strikes attracted 
massive support from large numbers of workers during that period, culminating to a 
strong labour movement. This eventually paved the way for the formation of a big 
coalition of opposition forces that later transformed into a vibrant political party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by the former secretary general of the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangirai. This development 
increased opposition political activism especially in the country’s urban areas. The 
rejection of government proposed constitutional reforms in the referendum of February 
2000 saved as protest vote reacting to the government’s failure to address the plight of 
the masses. This marked a landmark victory for opposition politics and widened the gap 
between the government and labour force. This development marked the beginning of 
rigorous fighting between government on one side and business, labour and the general 
population on the other side, fuelling tensions and economic and political problems 
which continued through out the crisis period.  
 
2.2.2. Contentious Government Policies 
The Zimbabwean crisis has also been largely attributed to controversial economic 
policies by the government in the late 1990s. The unplanned hefty payment of gratuities 
to the war veterans beginning in1997 is arguably one of the negative policies made by the 
Mugabe government. The government succumbed to intense political pressure and paid 
huge sums of money in gratuities to the country’s former freedom fighters.88 On this 
point, Brett argues that the dramatic collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar after the 
government made such huge payouts put a colossal drain onto the economy.89 On 14 
November 1997, the Zimbabwean dollar lost 71, 5 percent of its value against the U.S 
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dollar, a day analysts refer to as the ‘Black Friday’.90 This spectacular drop in the value 
of the country’s currency is vastly blamed on the war veterans’ pay-outs.91 Brett further 
argues that this caused a huge shock to the economy as “stock markets subsequently 
crashed, wiping away 46 percent from the value of shares as investors scrambled out of 
the Zimbabwe Dollar.”92 
 
 Furthermore, the Zimbabwean government took a costly decision to intervene in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war at a time when the country was facing 
rigorous fiscal problems. In this regard, Brett notes that “in 1998, there was a ruinous 
expensive military expedition in the Democratic Republic of Congo at a time when…the 
fiscal deficit was increasingly funded by printing money and borrowing from the 
domestic banking system at a negative rate of interest.”93 This implies that the 
government’s decis ion to intervene in the DRC compounded the fiscal strain on the 
already ailing economy. On this note, Terrence Mashingaidze asserts that “At its height 
in 2000, the DRC military venture drained at least US$1 million per day, from the 
Zimbabwean fiscus.”94 Perhaps what could have annoyed the West more was the fact that 
Zimbabwe was struggling to pay its debts to the IMF and the World Bank while spending 
more money in what they generally criticised as an unnecessary expenditure. Christian 
Peters-Berries puts is clearly asserting that, 
 
Western countries and funding agencies expressed concern first, 
about the spiralling budget deficits, then about the farm invasions, 
the breakdown of the rule of law, the contempt for human rights, 
and finally about the political violence which had engulfed the 
country since March 2000.95 
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It is also believed that the government re-established pre-ESAP controls over the 
exchange rates and the grain marketing so as to generate massive rents for significant 
members of the political elite.96 Overvalued exchange rates fixed by the country’s 
Reserve Bank continually suppressed the flow of exports from Zimbabwe. The 
widespread printing of money by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe also contributed to 
skyrocketing inflation which scared away foreign investors. 
 
 2.2.3. Land Reform and Escalating Violence 
The rise of the war veterans to the political domain in 2000 further compounded the 
pressure for the Zimbabwean government. The increasing power and vibrancy of the war 
veterans set up a new impetus for a radical land reform process. With a government 
slowly responding to their demands, the former freedom fighters orchestrated a 
nationwide occupation of commercial farms largely controlled by the white community at 
that time. Violence, intimidation and human rights abuses ensued, mainly targeted on 
farm owners, farm workers as well as any dissenting voices. Opposition members 
together with their supporters also became victims of violence especially in the 
parliamentary election campaigns of the same year.97 Commenting on these 
developments, Brian Raftopoulos argued that, “accompanying the physical violence, the 
ruling party launched a torrent of abuse on the opposition, designed to depict them as a 
privileged urban minority controlled by whites and foreigners, and ‘tainted’ with money 
from right-wing conservative racists associated with Rhodesia.”98 This branding of 
political dissent was used by the ZANU-PF government to legitimise the repression of 
opposition activists and supporters.99 In addition, violence continued in the run up to the 
2002 presidential election as the government sought to subvert opposition forces in the 
electoral race.  
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Thus from 2000, Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector began to experience its greatest 
challenges since the country’s independence. In essence, agriculture, used to be the 
fulcrum of the economy in terms of income earning, employment and foreign currency 
earnings.  In support of this, the Craig Richardson asserts that, “the farm sector supplied 
about 60 percent of inputs to the manufacturing base---so agriculture was truly the 
backbone of the economy.”100 According to Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, the 
production of maize (Zimbabwe’s staple food crop) dropped by 86 percent between 2000 
and 2005.101 This decline was mainly due to the fact that a large number of commercial 
farmers, reportedly 80 percent, were forced to leave their farms during the violent land 
occupations.102 In this regard, the Diplomats’ Handbook argues that, “forcible seizures of 
white-owned land by ZANU-PF ‘war veterans’…began to seriously destabilise 
Zimbabwe’s economy.”103 The invasions of commercial farms thus, significantly reduced 
agricultural output, hence leading to persistent food shortages for the country’s 
population. 
 
In 2008, during the run-up to the joint parliamentary and presidential elections, the 
Zimbabwean society went through a period of extreme anxiety stemming from violence, 
intimidation and gross violations of human rights. The security forces, intelligence 
services and an array of alleged government-sponsored militias, the infamous ‘green 
bombers’ reportedly waged a wave of terror against civilians and committed gross human 
rights violations particularly against suspected opposition activists and supporters.104 
Various local and international media reports put forward that violence escalated to 
exceptional levels between March and June 2008 during the campaigns for the 
presidential run-off elections.105 It is also widely reported that tactics of the liberation 
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struggle such as re-education camps, propaganda and all-night meetings popularly known 
as ‘pungwes’ were revived during the campaigns. These events led to widespread 
intimidation and internal displacements, conditions which extremely destabilised the 
Zimbabwean society. According to Todd Moss, the resultant high levels of suspicion and 
a steep deterioration of the country’s social capital contributed to devastating economic 
effects.106 
 
2.2.4. Western Isolation 
As violence increased, Western governments and human rights advocates were 
increasingly concerned about Zimbabwe’s deteriorating political situation. Continual 
human rights violations and the defiance of the rule of law prompted the isolation of the 
Zimbabwean government mainly by its traditional partners from the West. In particular, 
the U.S, the European Union countries and Australia imposed targeted sanctions and 
travel bans on ZANU-PF leadership in 2001 to show their displeasure with the country’s 
situation. These sanctions limited the government’s capacity to travel and engage their 
Western counterparts. They also precluded Western countries from giving monetary 
assistance or aid to the Zimbabwean government as it was perceived that the money 
would be used to support the government’s repressive institutions and policies. In this 
way, the sanctions thus, aggravated the country’s economic decline as they prevented the 
government from engaging into economic deals with its traditional trading partners. The 
IMF and the World Bank also suspended financial assistance to Zimbabwe.  
 
Moreover, traditional investors and aid partners mostly from the West began to withdraw 
from Zimbabwe. Scepticism and fear grew among investors as they went on to reduce 
their activities in the country with some relocating to neighbouring Mozambique and 
South Africa and other African countries. Albert Makochekanwa and Marko Kwaramba 
captured this succinctly when they said that, “the country’s diplomatic, political, and 
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commercial and trade relations, especially with strong and economically powerful 
countries around the world have declined sharply over the past decade.”107 
 
2.3. Indicators of the Zimbabwean Crisis 
2.3.1. Economic meltdown 
Between 1999 and 2008, the Zimbabwean economy shrunk to unprecedented levels.108 
Albert Makochekanwa and Marko Kwaramba report that “statistical figures from the IMF 
indicate that Zimbabwe’s economic activities cumulatively shrunk by nearly two-thirds, 
that is, 62.6 percent in the space of a decade covering 1999 to 2008.”109 Also, the 
purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean, as indicated by the GDP per capita, 
drastically fell during the course of the crisis with an estimated 80 percent of the 
population already living under the poverty datum line of per capita income of US$15 by 
the end of 2003.110 The figure is believed to have risen above 90 percent by the first 
month of 2009.111 In addition, the IMF noted that due to the state fragility, Zimbabwe’s 
expenditure declined by 83.3 percent within a space of three years from approximately 
US$1.5 billion in 2005 to US$251 million in 2008 resulting in almost a complete collapse 
in the provision of public services. 
 
During the crisis period, economic production in Zimbabwe also took a cumulative 
downfall. As a result of the huge cuts in investments, critical sectors such as agriculture, 
mining and manufacturing suffered enormous losses in output. This saw the economy 
operating at only 10 percent of its normal capacity resulting in meagre export and import 
transactions.112  In terms of monetary and fiscal activities, the deteriorating economic 
situation during the Zimbabwean crisis saw inflation rising from a single digit in the late 
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1990s to more than a staggering 8,000 percent in 2007, becoming the highest in the world 
at that time.113  
 
In addition, during the period under review, Zimbabwe experienced the acute shortages 
not only of foreign currency (which resulted in a thriving black market) but also of its 
own local currency. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) embarked on an excessive 
money printing scheme which however, regularly failed to cope with the rising demand 
for nominal cash notes as the crisis worsened. While the RBZ controlled the flow of 
foreign currency through ‘unrealistic’ exchange rates, the parallel market in foreign 
exchange flourished at the expense of the government and the general public. This 
resulted in hyperinflation increasing to astronomical figures which made it even more 
difficult to quantify the depth and breadth of the growing crisis. At this stage, Cato Senior 
Fellow, Steve Hanke developed Hyperinflation Index for Zimbabwe derived from 
market-based data. In his illustration, Hanke presented that “as of 14 November 2008, 
Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate was 89.7 Sextillion (1021) percent.”114 During this 
hyper inflationary period, foreign currencies replaced the Zimbabwean dollar in a rapid 
and spontaneous manner until the economy was eventually dollarized in January 2009.115 
 
Table 1 presents the country’s socio-economic and political indicators since 
independence in 1980. Zimbabwe enjoyed positive economic growth for nearly eighteen 
(18) years with the exception of 1984 and 1992 due to severe drought.116  This growth 
trend, however, changed for the worse since 1999 and through the crisis period as 
economic growth rates became continuously negative. 
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Table 1: Zimbabwe’s economic and political performance (1999-2008) 
 
 
Year              GDP GDP per 
capita 
Annual Inflation CPI Political Environment 
 US$ 
Billions 
%   Growth US$          %  Political 
Rights (PR)7 
Civil 
Liberties 
1980-
1998 
7.0 3.9 740.4   20.5  4.7 5 
1999 6.0 -3.6 508 56.9  5 5 
2000 5.7 -7.3 489 55.2  6 5 
2001 
 
5.7 -2.7 490 112.1  6 5 
2002 5.6 -4.4 478 198.9 2.7 6 6 
2003 5.1 -10.4 433 598.7 2.3 6 6 
2004 5.0 -3.6 430 132.7 2.3 6 6 
2005 5.0 -4.0 427 585.8 2.6 7 6 
2006 4.9 -5.4 417 1,281.1 2.4 7 6 
2007 4.7 -6.1 403 108,844.1 2.1 7 6 
2008 3.2 -14.1 <402 489,000,000,000 1.8 7 6 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database and IMF (2009) for 2008 figures 
 
2.3.2. Political Repression 
Rigorous restrictions on political and civil liberties characterized the Zimbabwe’s 
political environment during the crisis period. The government came up with various 
measures to restrict the people’s civic freedoms, notably, freedom of expression and 
association. The enactment of ‘draconian’ laws such the Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) 
represented a clear attempt of political repression by the Zimbabwean government. The 
government also passed the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services Act mainly to control 
private media that was suspected of broadcasting a negative image of the country’s 
situation. Violence mainly targeted on suspected MDC supporters in both rural and urban 
areas around the country also characterized election processes since 2000. This worsened 
in 2008 particularly after the disputed March elections during the campaigns for the 
presidential run-off elections. A glimpse at the political and civil liberties indices from 
the Freedom House as presented in Table 1 shows that the country’s ratings since 2000 
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have been above six (6), indicating a repressive environment. According to 
Makochekanwa and Kwaramba:  
 
The intensification of political instability and macroeconomic instability 
following the coming into fore of resilience opposition political party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, the controversial land 
reform since 1999 and most importantly, the fact that the country had been 
increasingly isolated from the international community, have resulted in 
political factors being some of the major determinants of state fragility in 
the country. That is, because of this dictatorial, repressive and 
undemocratic regime, the then government was not willing to create an 
environment whereby the majority citizens can endeavour to mitigate 
poverty, neither was the government willing and able to provide adequate 
basic services such as health, education and water to the majority 
citizens.117 
 
2.3.3. Poverty 
The Zimbabwean crisis was also depicted by massive decline in the buying power of the 
country’s general population. Both the unemployed and the gainfully employed struggled 
to afford basic commodities as inflation continued soaring. The Oxford Analytica Report 
revealed that the estimated cost of living for a family of six was above 10 times higher 
than the salary of an average nurse and more than 20 times the salary of a low-ranking 
soldier.118 As a result of this, many people in the country were left with few but difficult 
options for survival. Most Zimbabweans resorted to informal trading, selling different 
types products including groceries as commodity availability became limited on the 
formal market. Some entered into cross-border trading, bringing various goods including 
clothes, groceries and electrical appliances from neighbouring countries as a survival 
strategy. A significant number left the country for greener pastures in the diaspora. Todd 
Moss affirmed this point when he said, “the most outward sign of the Zimbabwean crisis 
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is the mass flight of people.”119 On the same point, Moss reports that by 2002, there were 
already about 3.4 million Zimbabweans living outside the country resulting from the 
difficult living conditions in the country. 120 
 
During the crisis period, the people of Zimbabwe continued to suffer in the face of severe 
shortages of basic commodities particularly food products and fuel. Without sufficient 
foreign currency, the government could not import valuable supplies from abroad.  Petrol 
and diesel, mostly unavailable at official prices could only be accessible on the black 
market, at prices far much higher than the government gazetted rates. The shortage of 
food in the country however posed a huge crisis to large sections of the population 
particularly in rural areas.  Shortages were seen in basic commodities such as bread, 
mealie-meal, rice, sugar, flour, cooking oil, products that were mostly unavailable from 
the formal stores and supermarkets. Such commodities were however, readily available at 
exorbitant prices from the black market. This was exacerbated by the fact that non-
governmental organisations involved in food distribution were either periodically banned 
or strictly controlled, restraining their role in alleviating the peoples’ suffering. 121 
 
2.3.4. Health, Sanitation and Infrastructure 
The depth of the Zimbabwean crisis was also epitomised by the deterioration of 
infrastructure around the country. This was become largely conspicuous in government 
and other public buildings in cities and rural districts as local authorities lacked funds to 
maintain and repair the infrastructure. This was also shown by unrepaired roads, schools 
and hospitals around the country. The country also experienced erratic supply of water 
and other sanitation facilities. This was exposed by a collapse of the sewage reticulation 
in most urban areas around the country,  especially in high density suburbs. Lack of 
foreign currency reduced the government’s capacity to procure water treating chemicals 
and to maintain or buy equipment for refuse collection. The persistent power cuts 
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experienced during the crisis period and still a common feature to date also help to shed 
more light on the gravity of the Zimbabwean crisis. In addition, the shocks of the 
economic decline left the government without financial capacity to import electricity. 
This caused unprecedented disruptions in power supply and distribution still noticeable 
today as the inclusive government struggles to put sanity in this sector. 
 
The crisis period in Zimbabwe also witnessed the gradual deterioration of the country’s 
healthcare system. The worst case scenarios in this sector were recorded in 2008 when 
major government controlled and the biggest referral hospitals (Parirenyatwa Hospital in 
Harare and Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo) were closed as their appalling conditions did 
not only fail to save patients but also exposed them to other health infections due to poor 
maintenance, servicing and lack of sanitary supplies. The country’s only medical school 
at Parirenyatwa Hospital in Harare was also closed in 2008 for the same reasons. The 
massive exodus of medical personnel to the private and the diaspora also presented a 
huge blow on Zimbabwe’s healthcare system during the crisis. The Zimbabwe 
Association of Doctors for Human Rights reported that by December 2008 the 
doctor/patient ration in Zimbabwe was one doctor to eight thousand patients (1: 8 000).122 
This saw the country suffering the second-worst maternal mortality rate in the world after 
Sierra Leone, with an estimate of 130 out of every 1,000 babies dying shortly after 
birth.123 
 
Zimbabwe’s healthcare sector came under a huge test with the cholera outbreak of 
August 2008. The deadly cholera outbreak pushed an already overstretched healthcare 
system to a breaking point. By May 2009, the World Health Organisation (WHO) had 
recorded 97,965 cases of cholera in the count ry, with 4 273 cholera-related deaths.124 The 
poor water and sanitation system in the country’s urban areas exacerbated the rapid 
spread of the cholera epidemic to several parts of the country. As this problem rose 
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beyond the government’s capacity, other countries together with some national and 
international organisations came to the rescue of the suffering Zimbabwean population. A 
special report by Doctors Without Borders linked this cholera outbreak to the broader 
economic and political crisis saying, “The political crisis and the resultant economic 
collapse led to the implosion of the health system and basic infrastructure which has 
given rise to a massive cholera outbreak.”125 
 
 
The gravity of the political situation during the crisis can also be shown by the surge in 
political refugees in the country’s neighbours. Fearing for their lives, a significant 
number of Zimbabweans crossed into neighbouring Botswana and South Africa with 
some seeking political asylum in the United Kingdom where they also expected to be 
economically well off than at home. For most Zimbabweans who found refuge in South 
Africa, the situation turned even more sour when a devastating xenophobic violence 
erupted in May 2008 as native South Africans protested against strained public services 
and unemployment largely blamed on increasing numbers of foreigners in their country.   
 
2.4. The Zimbabwean Crisis and External Actors  
The deteriorating Zimbabwean economic and political situation presented above attracted 
immense international attention. As mentioned earlier, various countries and international 
institutions responded to the situation differently. Lauren Ploch puts it clearly when he 
said that “the international community appears divided on how to respond to Zimbabwe’s 
persistent political and economic crisis.”126 The following discussion presents the various 
responses by different members of the international community. 
 
2.4.1. The United States of America 
Since the beginning of the crisis, the United States maintained a critical stance against 
President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party. The deteriorating political situation provoked 
huge criticism from the U.S government which went on to lead other Western countries 
to come up with ways of isolating the Zimbabwean government. The U.S government 
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opted for punitive measures against the ZANU PF leadership after failing to persuade the 
Mugabe government to adopt political and economic reforms. The Bush Administration 
instituted targeted sanctions (travel bans) on high-ranking ZANU-PF officials and their 
affiliates while at the same time putting pressure on South Africa to lead an African 
brokered solution to restore order and sanity in the country. In 2001, the U.S Senate 
passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) citing 
economic mismanagement and undemocratic practices in Zimbabwe.127  This legislation 
called for consultations with U.S allies on economic sanctions and travel bans for 
Zimbabwe’s top government officials.  The proposed sanctions would preclude ZANU-
PF leadership from going to the U.S for business trips and even for negotiating 
government to government non-humanitarian deals with the United States.128 The 
sanctions were made to stand until such a time when the Zimbabwean government would 
have implemented economic and political reforms to ensure processes of democratic 
governance and economic accountability.  
 
Tensions between Zimbabwe and the United States were further aggravated in 2005 after 
the U.S Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice issued out a damaging report of severe 
human rights violations during ‘Operation Murambatsvina’. Following her evaluation of 
the situation, Rice labelled Zimbabwe as one of six ‘outposts of tyranny.’129 Responding 
to this the U.S government led a motion on UN sanctions against Zimbabwe and for the 
country to be suspended from the world’s governing body. This motion was however 
vetoed by China and Russia in the UN Security Council.130 The U.S government 
however, extended its existing targeted sanctions on ZANU-PF government officials. In 
2007, President Bush announced the renewal of these sanctions, reporting that the 
government of Zimbabwe had not done any improvements to its human rights and 
governance record to support democratic processes.131 In March 2009, the Obama 
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administration extended U.S sanctions on Zimbabwe for another year suggesting that 
challenges to democracy under President Mugabe were continuing and the crisis had not 
been addressed.132 
 
Despite its condemnation of Zimbabwe in the last decade, the U.S government did not 
entirely turn its back on the country. The American government continued to support 
African diplomatic processes aimed at resolving Zimbabwe’s problems. This was shown 
in President Bush’s statements during his visit to South Africa in 2003, when he praised 
the work of then President Thabo Mbeki as the “point man seeking a Zimbabwe 
solution.”133 While acknowledging that more work needed to be done on the 
Zimbabwean issue, the U.S government applauded the efforts made by South Africa 
through SADC and the African Union in facilitating negotiations on solutions to 
Zimbabwe’s problems. The United States government also continued to help the people 
of Zimbabwe through humanitarian aid assistance channelled through various 
programmes and projects run by American based interna tional organisations, particularly 
the United States Agency in International Development (USAID). USAID was mainly 
active for ameliorating the crisis by distributing food and health supplies in various parts 
of the country. The organisation also participated in supporting local democratic agencies 
in Zimbabwe through a variety of programs aimed at ensuring media freedom and 
strengthening civil society and legislative processes.134 
 
2.4.2. The United Kingdom and the European Union 
The contemporary British response to the Zimbabwean crisis has to be understood in the 
context of Britain’s traditional protection of white commercial farmers since Zimbabwe’s 
independence. This was guaranteed in the 1979, Lancaster House constitution adopted by 
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the Zimbabwean government at independence. The constitution conferred property rights 
to the commercial farmers through which they would only give back land by selling it  to 
the government through the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ arrangement. The arrangement 
lost credibility when the Tony Blair administration backtracked on the British 
government’s promise to provide funds to the Zimbabwean government to purchase land 
for resettlement. Faced with a growing number of landless citizens in the country, the 
Zimbabwean government was under pressure to provide land which had been promised 
for a long time since the days of the liberation struggle.  
 
From 1997 however, tensions between the two countries were intensified by growing 
differences in principle and ideology between the Labour Party and the ZANU-Pf 
government. As Hasu Patel and Stephen Chan argue, leaders from both Zimbabwe and 
the United Kingdom became entranced in conviction politics, deeply committed to their 
different principles concerning governance and economic management.135  The Labour 
Party undertook to promote adherence to accepted tenets of the contemporary 
development discourse, that is, good governance, human rights and viable (essentially 
neo- liberal) economic policies while in contrast, the ZANU PF government of Zimbabwe 
did not give precedents to any of these convictions.136 As a result the Labour Party was 
not hesitant on using the Zimbabwean crisis to score political goals, heavily blaming it on 
the government’s economic mismanagement to justify its demands for economic and 
political reforms on the country. Perhaps the Labour Party saw itself as making new 
history mainly by differentiating its approach from the Thatcher government of the 1980s 
which allegedly did not give particular attention to human rights violations in Zimbabwe 
as it failed to criticise or take action against the Matabeleland massacres.137  
 
In the same way, ZANU-PF also created its own history, defying the odds by publicly 
turning against its traditional aid and trading partners, for example by withdrawing its 
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membership from the Commonwealth. Hasu Patel captured this succinctly when he said 
that, “ZANU-PF sees itself as the revolutionary vanguard maker and continuing guardian 
of the ‘earlier’ history [of the armed struggle for independence], which is also current 
history.”138  As a result, this clash of interests, personalities and principles increased 
tensions between the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. This further worsened the 
fractured Zimbabwe-West relations, increasingly denting Zimbabwe’s image in the eyes 
of other Western countries. As the situation continued to deteriorate, Britain championed 
efforts in multilateral forums particularly in the European Union to impose targeted 
sanctions on leading ZANU-PF members as well as freezing their assets in the Western 
countries.139  
 
Ian Taylor and Paul Williams argue that, the acrimony between Zimbabwe and the 
British government erupted over the issue of land.140 The land issue however, had been a 
major stumbling block between the two governments since Zimbabwe’s independence. 
Until 2000, approximately 4,500 white Zimbabwean farmers, most of them with British 
origins owned 70 per cent or 11 million hectares of Zimbabwe’s prime agricultural 
land.141 The resettlement programs that followed after independence in the 1980s had 
failed to reverse this huge discrepancy in land ownership. This was further complicated 
by the failure of the British government to honour the promise to provide funds to the 
Zimbabwean government for buying land from commercial farmers for resettling the 
black populations.142 Terrence Mashingaidze noted that “the majority of the white 
farmers who lost land are of British stock hence the west’s attitude towards Zimbabwe is 
a matter of fighting a kith and kin war”. 143 As a result, leaders within the Zimbabwean 
government strongly maintain that the land question is only mentioned to highlight the 
plight of the former white land owners and to attribute the country’s food shortages and 
                                                 
138 Hasu Patel and Stephen Chan: Op cit , p. 186 
139 Lauren Plock: Op cit, p. 32 
140 Ian Taylor and Paul Williams: “The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in 
Zimbabwe” International Affairs, Volume 78, No. 3 July 2002, p. 549 
141 Ibid 
142 For more details about tension between Zimbabwe and Britain over the land issue see the discussion 
article by Hasu Patel and Stephen Chan: Op Cit, p. 175-190 
143 Terence Mashingaidze: “The Zimbabwean Entrapment: An Analysis of the Ne xus between Domestic 
and Foreign Policies in a “Collapsing” Militant State, 1990s-2006”, Turkish Journal of International 
Relations, Volume 5, No. 4, Winter 2006, p. 65 
41 
 
the economic hardships to the land reform programme.144 It is therefore the land issue 
which became the main point of friction between the Mugabe government and the British 
authorities during the crisis period. As Britain’s frustration with Mugabe’s intransigence 
grew, the Blair administration together with the Bush administration in the U.S led a 
campaign to sway global opinion against Zimbabwe.  
 
2.4.3. The African Union, SADC and the Third World 
Contrary to the Western position of isolation, most Africa governments (with the 
exception of Botswana and Senegal) and much of the Third World decisively stood 
behind the Zimbabwean government.145 Much to the frustration of many countries in the 
West, the African Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries endorsed the presidential election of 
2002 as free and fair.146 This was a huge blow to the Western expectations particularly 
Britain and the United States which had refused to accept the election outcome 
complaining of irregularities. The African Union together with SADC however, 
continued to push for dialogue between Zimbabwe’s political rivals as a solution to the 
country’s problems. In a demonstration of support to the Zimbabwean government, ACP 
members opposed the banning of the Zimbabwean delegation of deputy ministers from 
attending the ACP-EU Joint Assembly scheduled for November 25-28, 2002.147 On this 
point, Mashingaidze asserts that, for the first time since the creation of the partnership in 
1975, the Joint Assembly failed to take place as the ACP members boycotted the session 
in solidarity with Zimbabwe.148 This situation sent a strong message to the Western 
countries that had teamed up against Zimbabwe and partly showed the Third World 
strength and solidarity against Western unilateralism. 
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Although the costs of the Zimbabwean crisis were much higher for the SADC region as 
compared to the wider international community, isolating the country in any way was not 
on their agenda. SADC countries had to deal with most of the ripple effects of the crisis, 
for example, the influx of illegal immigrants fleeing from either political repression or the 
country’s deplorable economic conditions. This problem mainly affected South Africa 
and Botswana. In SADC, Zimbabwe was not only the second strongest economy (after 
South Africa) but also a central link in the transport network of the region. In addition, 
Zimbabwe was also the region’s electricity grid, and a food security fulcrum. 149 As a 
result of its importance therefore, any negative publicity on Zimbabwe by her neighbours 
would present detrimental repercussions to the whole region especially in terms of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Although the direct consequences of the country’s 
instability on its neighbours were less visible at the beginning, the effects of the crisis 
became clearer as Zimbabwean political and economic refugees flocked into the 
neighbouring countries as the situation deteriorated. Much of these effects were 
epitomised in the xenophobic violence that engulfed South Africa in the winter season of 
2008.  The AU and SADC’s response to the Zimbabwean crisis since its beginning has 
rather been more diplomatic than confrontational as the regional bodies sought to find a 
dialogue solution. With the leadership of former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, 
SADC continued to engage Zimbabwe’s rival parties through the much criticised so-
called “quite diplomacy” until the signing of the Global Political Agreement at the ‘peak’ 
of the crisis in September 2008. 
 
2.4.4. China 
China remains one of the dominant forces in contemporary international relations. 
Recently, China appeared to be a major force, keen to limit the range of action of other 
powerful countries in multi- lateral relations. China does not put emphasis on the 
‘western’ applauded values of democracy, good governance and human rights. Owing to 
this, China’s actions and behaviour in the international system is usually at odds with 
those of Western countries. For example, China demonstrated its divergent approach to 
these norms when she partnered with Russia in 2005 to block Western backed UN 
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Security Council sanctions against President Mugabe’s government.150 Most recently, 
following the flawed June 2008 presidential run-off election in Zimbabwe, China again 
joined with Russia to veto UN targeted sanctions that would have imposed more travel 
bans and financial restrictions on ZANU-PF’s top officials.151 In response to the political 
crisis in Zimbabwe, China consistently preferred a dialogue solution, suggesting that any 
interference would constitute meddling with the domestic politics of the country. 152 Thus, 
China has been continually supporting the efforts of the regional formations, that is, 
mechanisms by the African Union and SADC in trying to come up with a negotiated 
settlement to the Zimbabwean political stalemate. Lui Guijin, China’s top envoy to Africa 
was quoted in several news outlets on China’s position towards the Zimbabwean situation 
saying, “We think the issues concerning Zimbabwe should only be resolved by the 
Zimbabwean people and the international community could play a constructive role by 
promoting dialogue and reconciliation”153 
 
Again, to the frustration of the West, China also joined the Third World solidarity in 
support of the Zimbabwean government. China’s response to the Zimbabwean crisis was 
much similar to most of the Third World countries. Perhaps China saw the gap left by 
Western disengagement as an opportunity to spread its influence in the country. In this 
endeavour, China came in with loans and credit lines coupled with investment interests in 
the Zimbabwean economy. At this stage it is important to indicate that much of China’s 
interventions in during the ‘Zimbabwean crisis’ will feature in the following chapters. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In general, as has been outlined in the foregoing discussion, Zimbabwe had its own 
structural problems after independence. The main and most urgent among these were 
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institutions inherited from the colonial government and the tribal rivalry between the 
Shona and the Ndebele. However, the difficult situation that the country has been 
experiencing started in the late 1990s owing to several reasons that have been explained 
in the discussion. The economic and political problems came about in various forms 
throughout the crisis. This however, triggered diverging responses among countries and 
other members of the international community. In short, Western countries and 
institutions preferred to put pressure on the Zimbabwean government through punitive 
measures and isolation while most of the Third World opted to stand firmly in support of 
a dialogue settlement to the Zimbabwean crisis. Thus, China stood out as a major source 
of support to Zimbabwe during this period.  Accordingly, China’s backing and close 
engagement with Zimbabwe will be discussed in the following chapter which traces the 
historical and the current nature of China-Zimbabwe relations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH 
ZIMBABWE  
 
3.1. The Foundations of China-Zimbabwe Relations  
 
China’s interaction with Zimbabwe stretches back to its support of Zimbabwe’s liberation 
struggle against colonialism and racial oppression. 154 The current relations between 
China and President Mugabe’s government are grounded on China’s support of 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), one of the movements which fought for the 
liberation of Zimbabwe. ZANU was formed in 1963 as a rival organisation to Joshua 
Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) which was under the support of the 
Soviet Union. 155 Upon its formation, ZANU sought military support from the Soviet 
Union just like many other liberation movements in Southern Africa. However, after 
failing to get Soviet military support, ZANU turned to the People’s Republic of China 
where it got military and strategic assistance to prosecute the liberation struggle.156 China 
thus, through supporting ZANU, found a method to propagate its anti-Soviet campaign in 
Southern Africa. China facilitated the training of guerrillas from ZANU’s military wing, 
the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).157 It was under the Chinese 
tutoring that ZANLA’s military tactics underwent fundamental transformation from 
conventional military tactics adopting the Maoist model which entailed mass mobilisation 
to revolutionalise the then Rhodesian black population. 158  It is important to note that the 
then ZANU leadership (which includes President Robert Mugabe and some members of 
his current ZANU-PF government who took over power at independence) continued to 
admire and therefore adopt Chinese principles and tactics into their own systems. 
Elements of Chinese impulses and influences still continue to be incorporated in the 
                                                 
154 Ian Taylor: China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, Routledge Taylor and Francis, London, 
2006, p. 106 
155 Loc cit 
156 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson: The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War, Zimbabwe 
Publishing Comp any, Harare, 1982, 88 
157 Loc cit 
158 David Lan: Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe ,  University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1985, p. 127-128 
46 
 
present governance and economic interactions between the two countries. This is mainly 
because of the Chinese socialisation embraced during these early years of the Chinese 
engagement with most leaders of the now ZANU-PF who still control the reins of power 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
On Independence Day, 18 April 1980, ZANU took over power after convincingly 
winning the elections and formed government, with Robert Mugabe as the Prime 
Minister.159 Immediately, the new government formalised its diplomatic relations with 
China.160  After independence, formal relations continued between the two countries, 
strengthened by high level visits of government officials in the years that followed. 
 
Post colonial relations between China and Zimbabwe were also cemented during the 
Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. The Chinese government’s brutal crackdown on 
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in 1989 which reportedly left roughly 3,000 
protesters dead,161 evoked heavy international criticism especially from Western states. 
Although the crisis was damaging on China’s image, it saved to reinforce China’s 
relations not only with Zimbabwe but also with other Third World countries which stood 
firmly as China’s strong constituency to defend its sovereignty and right to self 
governance.162  During this incident, Mugabe in particular, strongly supported the 
Chinese government asserting that, “any reforms in China can only take place on the 
basis of its own tradition and its own characteristics.”163 Furthermore, Mugabe also took 
that opportunity to extrapolate events from Africa’s colonial past to construct a 
justification of the Chinese repression of its own people when he reiterated that: 
  
There must not be any dictating to China by anybody. Let the Chinese 
evolve their system…it is dishonest of [the West] and hypocritical to try 
and preach democracy to China when they themselves have been guilty 
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of not practicing democracy for so long a time in our own areas of 
Africa and elsewhere.164 
 
In this regard, Zimbabwe firmly refused to join the anti-China campaign, declaring that it 
was Beijing’s right to stabilise its domestic situation on its own. 165 Perhaps Zimbabwe 
could not have criticised China at this time because it continued to get Chinese support 
despite its heavy military crackdown on dissenting voices during the Matabeleland 
disturbances of the early 1980s.  
 
The above explanation is important as it guides one to the principles on which the two 
countries’ relations are grounded. From the onset one can notice that there has been 
mutual respect for each other’s self governance systems between China and Zimbabwe 
for a long time. Consequently, early ties between China and Zimbabwe remain important 
today as they continue to direct the form and scope of interactions between the two 
countries. The two countries continued supporting each other even during times when the 
international community is critical on them. During the Zimbabwean crisis Chinese 
officials vowed not to interference in the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe.  
 
3.2. China-Zimbabwe relations during the crisis 
 
Since the beginning of Zimbabwe’s economic and political turmoil, relations with China 
turned more pragmatic and commercial however still grounded on the basic principles of 
sovereignty and non- intervention in one another’s internal affairs.166 At the turn of the 
century, China organised the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit to 
cement and expand political and economic ties between Beijing and African countries. 
Clearly the establishment of the FOCAC in 2000 became the instrumental vehicle which 
institutionalized Chinese symbolic diplomacy towards Africa.167 Within this framework, 
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relations between China and Zimbabwe were further consolidated through China’s credit 
facilities and loans to the Zimbabwean government as well as through investment 
projects in different sectors of the Zimbabwean economy as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Meanwhile the current China-Zimbabwe will be discussed in the context of 
Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy which further strengthened relations between the two 
countries. 
 
3.3. The ‘Look East’ Policy and China’s Involvement in Zimbabwe  
From the backdrop of a rapidly falling economy and a dented political image, the 
Zimbabwean government was compelled to look for alternative sources of financial and 
diplomatic support, hence the formulation and adoption of the ‘Look East’ policy in 
2003.168 The policy was formulated to curtail the effects of international isolation by 
courting investors and political allies from South-East Asia, the Far East and the Pacific 
countries.169 In this endeavour, Zimbabwe was able to develop cordial relations with 
countries such as China, Malaysia, India, Singapore, Indonesia Iran, and Pakistan.170 In 
response to this, Iran made efforts to underwrite Zimbabwe’s land reform in 2004 by 
providing agro-industrial equipment to the government.171 In addition to that, Iran also 
provided modern communication technology to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings, 
the government run and only broadcasting agency in the country. As a result of the 
ongoing stalemate between Zimbabwe and the West, the ‘Look East’ policy acquired 
high profile publicity in the Zimbabwean as well as the international media. The West 
however, became suspicious of the intentions of the Zimbabwean government in this 
venture as its promulgation raised the alarm about the return of a somewhat ideological 
standoff that existed during the Cold War.172 This probably resulted from the fact that the 
Zimbabwean government managed to strike deals with countries cast as “rogue states” by 
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the U.S and generally regarded as authoritarian in international circles. The main 
countries in this category are Libya, Sudan, North Korea and Iran. 173  
 
While the ‘Look East’ policy was initially scheduled to engage the Asian and other 
Pacific countries in broad sense, its implementation however saw the focus shifting to 
China.174 This was facilitated by China’s flexibility to provide a platform which allowed 
the two countries to pursue their own national interests whilst helping each other to curb 
the effects of Western supremacy. Hasu Patel labelled this as the “pursuit of the dispersal 
of dependence” by a small and weak state.175  While applauding the policy as a viable 
option for Zimbabwe at that time, Patel also doubted its adequacy in addressing the 
problems that the country was facing and felt that it would be more appropriate to regard 
the policy as complementary rather than an alternative to engaging the West.176 The 
Zimbabwean government however, anticipated more benefits from pursuing the policy 
than any potential costs. Thus, engaging an ‘old friend’ became a viable option as the two 
countries shared a long history of close ties tested during the difficult times of 
Zimbabwe’s independence struggle and the Tiananmen Square massacre. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘Look East’ policy is believed to be primarily calculated to shift 
economic and political dependence from the West to China.177 Stephen Marks notes that 
the policy was designed so that China could fill the gap left by Western disengagement 
from Zimbabwe as an alternative source of unconditional assistance and investments.178 
On the same note, Jeremy Youde argues that, “Mugabe uses the ‘Look East’ policy to 
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reassert Zimbabwe’s role on the international stage to gain greater prestige and 
legitimacy at home and abroad.179 In support of this point Ibbo Mandaza explains that, 
  
Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy is not an ideological assertion, the 
pursuit of an alternative ideology or rejection of the capitalist road. 
It is based essentially on the need to survive when the West has 
apparently turned its back on the former British colony, a country 
which if the entire story were told has been so historically and 
economically tied and compromised into an intricate web of 
dependence on the northern hemisphere.180 
 
In light of the above contributions, the ‘Look East’ policy is referred to as a method used 
by the Zimbabwean government to extend its sources of aid. Since Zimbabwe had for a 
long time depended on loans and support from the IMF, the World Bank and Western 
countries to fund its development projects, one can strongly agree with the sentiments 
that the ‘Look East’ policy was a strategy to construct a new dependency patron by 
engaging China. Complementing the ‘Look East’ policy, China and Zimbabwe entered 
into various cooperation agreements during the crisis period. China also made important 
strides in supporting Zimbabwe through loans, grants and by investing in the country’s 
key economic sectors.  
 
3.4. Cooperation arrangements between China and Zimbabwe  
 
Declining Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in light of isolation from traditional 
investors and decreasing donor assistance naturally led to the Zimbabwean government’s 
quest for alternative partners. This accelerated its engagement with emerging Asian 
economies through the ‘Look East’ policy as discussed above. In this venture, Zimbabwe 
determined to revive close interactions with China. This saw the signing of several 
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bilateral cooperation agreements between the Harare and Beijing governments during the 
crisis period. An overview of recent bilateral agreements between Zimbabwe and China 
is presented in Table 2, a number of these agreements will be explored in further sections. 
 
Table 2: Recent Bilateral Agreements between China and Zimbabwe  
 
Year Type of Agreement Specifics Value 
December 
2002 
Economic & Technical 
Cooperation 
Grant to secure irrigation 
equipment for agricultural 
purposes 
US$ 5 
million 
July 2003 Technological Cooperation  Grant to assist developmental 
programs in economic and 
technical areas 
US$ 4.5 
million 
February 
2004 
Economic & Technical 
Cooperation 
  
June 2004 Tourism agreement Granting of approved tourism 
destination status 
 
November 
2004 
Six agreements and contracts 
including an economic and 
technical cooperation 
agreement; Exploration rights 
on minerals; JV with China 
North Industries Cooperation  
  
June 2005 Agreement signed Rehabilitation of the National 
power grid in return for chrome 
resources 
US$ 1.3 
billion 
July 2005 Agreement on Economic & 
Technical Cooperation 
China National Aero-
Technology Import & Export 
Corporation with Zimbabwean 
Ministry of Communication  
Export of 
another 
MA60 on top 
of two 
delivered in 
May 2005 
July 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding for Loan 
financing 
Expansion of Zimbabwe’s 
Hwange Power Station AND 
Agreement on Aircraft Spares 
Bonded Warehouse 
 
2005 Grant 39 military trucks and 
education and medical 
equipment 
US$ 3 
million 
May 2006 Grant Military machines and 
construction equipment to 
Zimbabwean Defense Forces 
US$ 1.5 
million 
2006 Technical Cooperation Training of 55 military officers  
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between 2006 and 2007 
April 2007 Four bilateral cooperation 
documents including one 
economic & technical 
cooperation agreement 
Includes a credit facility to be 
paid off in tobacco over 2 years 
US$ 58 
million 
 
Source: Various public media reports181 
 
3.5. Zimbabwe as a recipient of Chinese aid 
China undertook to support the Zimbabwean government by injecting huge amounts of 
aid and grants, export credits and concessional loans, as well as technical and economic 
assistance. Grants in this case are defined as non-repayable financial facilities provided to 
Zimbabwe by China based on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the 
governments of the two countries (see Table 2). Extended usually in-kind rather than 
cash, grants have included food aid, agricultural equipment and equipment for rural 
development projects. The Chinese Government’s aid around the world has been 
estimated to a total of approximately US$ 2 billion. 182 However, statistics on China’s 
development assistance to Zimbabwe do not exist and are believed to be relatively small. 
An overview of Chinese assistance in form of grants is provided in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3: Chinese grants to Zimbabwe 
 
Year Value 
(Chinese 
RMB) 
Purpose 
2001 1 million Purchase of office equipment 
2002 40 million Purchase of irrigation equipment 
 8.3 million Procurement of agricultural inputs and animal vaccines 
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 31.7 million Transport 
2002 30 million Refurbishment and maintenance of the Zimbabwe National 
Sports Stadium 
2004 15 million Transport 
2004 25 million Purchase of aircraft from China as agreed 
2005 50 million  Purchase of maize 
2006 
 
US$ 1.5 
million 
Funds are earmarked for the purchase of agricultural inputs 
 
 
Source: AFRODAD Fact Sheet183 
 
Although China’s recent engagements in African countries has been mainly aimed at 
striking strategic deals for its growth interests, it has also been involved in scant 
humanitarian intervention in others. For example, the provision of non-refundable grants 
to the Zimbabwean government as presented above represent an important part of this 
commitment. China has also been giving grants for the maintenance of the Harare 
National Sports Stadium, one of the major construction projects given to the Chinese by 
the Zimbabwean authorities after independence. The latest grant for this purpose was a 30 
million yuan given in 2002 for the refurbishment of the facility. 184 Other grants awarded 
were used for the purchase of office equipment for various government ministries as well 
as buying agricultural and irrigation equipment.185 The 2005 grant awarded for the 
buying for maize corresponded with a humanitarian emergency in Zimbabwe after the 
country had received low agricultural output due to the contentious land reform process, 
compounded by a drought that struck most parts of the Southern African region in that 
year.  
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3.6. China’s Loans to Zimbabwe 
During the crisis period, China also extended a number of loan facilities to the 
Zimbabwean government. The most common were the low interest loan agreements with 
a long maturity awarded by China’s Export and Import Bank (EXIM Bank)  solely owned 
by the Chinese government.186 As the only provider of the Chinese government 
concessional loans, EXIM Bank offers package deals structured specifically to address 
the needs of African governments. The Exim Bank’s loans are mainly applied in the 
sectors of infrastructure development, such as power stations, transport, 
telecommunication and housing projects. In 2001, China EXIM Bank provided a 
concessional loan to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Water for Infrastructural Development.187 
Through this loan the District Development Fund (DDF) acquired equipment worth US$ 
8 million for the development, maintenance and upgrading of road infrastructure.188 
Similarly in 2006, the Zimbabwe Farmers Development Company benefited from an 
EXIM Bank concessional loan to obtain agricultural equipment and tools worth US$ 25 
million. 189 
 
The China EXIM Bank also extends export credits used to facilitate the export of Chinese 
capital goods (mainly mechanic and electronic products) and new high- tech products to 
overseas construction and investment projects.190 The Government of Zimbabwe was 
awarded with a Buyer’s Credit loan facility by EXIM Bank valued at US$200 million in 
August 2006 to purchase necessary inputs into the country’s underperforming agriculture 
sector.191 These included fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural tools as well as irrigation 
equipment which Harare had been unable to purchase due to the shortage of foreign 
currency. The necessary equipment and agricultural inputs were envisaged to increase 
productivity in the agricultural sector. In July 2007, at the opening of the 3rd session of 
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the Sixth Parliament of Zimbabwe, President Mugabe suggested that the buyer’s credit 
loan agreement helped in improving stability in the supply of agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers and chemicals.192The terms and conditions of China’s interest free and 
concessional loans are however, rarely made public and it is therefore difficult to 
distinguish between these and commercial loans. Also, the differences are further 
confused by the regular use of ‘barter trade’ systems in which part of Zimbabwe’s 
exports to China are used to repay loans provided as part of these kind exchange 
arrangements. One of the largest deals of this nature was the US$ 58 million for 
agricultural equipment in exchange for tobacco.193 
 
3.7. China’s Investment Projects in Zimbabwe 
 
Although China had long been involved in Zimbabwe’s development projects, the last 
decade saw a significant rise in Chinese investments in the country. In the beginning, 
China’s investments were mainly concentrated in the extractive sectors, responding to the 
exponential growth in the demand for raw materials and mineral ores for its burgeoning 
industry. Chinese based companies also entered Zimbabwe’s manufacturing, agriculture, 
retail, transport and infrastructural development. As in other African countries, China is 
moving beyond merely securing essential inputs to acquiring stakes in potentially 
productive enterprises in Zimbabwe. Commenting on China’s ventures in the country, 
Chris Melville and Olly Owen argued that, “… Chinese state-owned enterprises have 
assembled a portfolio of shares in some of Zimbabwe’s prize assets.”194 In light of this 
statement, it is vital to look closely into China’s involvement in these different sectors of 
the Zimbabwe’s economy. 
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3.7.1. Mining 
Zimbabwe is wealthily endowed with different mineral ores particula rly along the Great 
Dyke on the central part of the country.  These mineral resources are of particular interest 
not only to China but also to other countries in the developed world including private 
investors from Britain and the United States. Referring to these mineral endowments, 
Hilton Mumba, a Zimbabwean commentator said that, “Zimbabwe’s Great Dyke contains 
inexhaustible deposits of chrome, copper, platinum (the second largest in the world 
estimated at over US$500 billion) and nickel among others. Washington and London are 
well aware of these untapped minerals and riches.”195 On the same note Sachikonye 
points out that, “Zimbabwe has the second largest reserves of platinum in the world, and 
substantial reserves of chrome.”196 These minerals therefore attracted great interest from 
Chinese investors who saw the withdrawal of Western capital as an opportunity for them 
to step in the country’s rich resources. In November 2004, China and Zimbabwe signed 
several co-operation agreements in this sector.197 It is reported that most of the 
agreements signed during this time gave exploration rights to a group of Chinese experts 
to study mineral resources in Zimbabwe.198 Of particular significance was the joint 
venture with China North Industries Corporation (Norinco). Chinese investments proved 
to be critical when Norinco granted reprieve to the Hwange Colliery Company (HCC) 
after US$6.3 million debt had accrued and threaten to ruin production in one of 
Zimbabwe’s strategic mines relied upon by most industries for coal supplies.199  
  
In addition to their great interest in Zimbabwe’s platinum ores, the Chinese also explored 
other minerals in the country such as nickel and copper. In 2008, the Mineral Marketing 
Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
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Chinese Nickel Company, Jinchuan Nickel Mining Company of China.200 Jinchuan is the 
biggest producer of nickel and cobalt in China with annual production capacity of 130 
000 tonnes of nickel, 200 000 of copper and 6 000 tonnes of cobalt.201  It is reported that 
the deal required Zimbabwe to sell these minerals to China. Presenting the report in the 
Parliament, MMCZ Chief Executive Officer, Onesimo Moyo described the deal as 
strategic adding that it could be a catalyst for the accelerated marketing of Zimbabwe’s 
mineral in China. This mining deal with a Chinese company seems to be strategically 
established to attract more Chinese investments in Zimbabwe’s resources in line with the 
government’s ‘Look East’ policy. 
 
Large Chinese investments have also been noticeable in the metals and minerals 
processing industries of Zimbabwe. In 2003 by the Chinese Shanghai Baosteel Group 
invested US$300 million in this sector. This investment is reported to have created 2000 
jobs.202 Part of the investment was used to buy equipment for boosting iron steel 
production in the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation (ZISCO). Moreover, as part of its 
investment efforts in this industry, Sinosteel, China’s second largest iron and steel dealer 
signed an investment agreement with the Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company 
(ZIMASCO) in September 2007.203 This investment was expected to boost the company 
which at that time was in deep financial problems resulting from the withdrawal of 
Western sources.  
 
3.7.2. Agriculture 
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector was also heavily affected by the withdrawal of Western 
support from the country.  With the hastily implemented land reform between 2000 and 
2003, the sector experienced a steep decline in productivity. Among other problems, the 
agricultural sector suffered critical shortages of fertilizers, agro-chemicals and erratic 
supply of other inputs. The deterioration of the country’s fertilizer plants also 
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compounded the situation. In order to show its support of Zimbabwe’s land reform 
programme, the Chinese government donated US$241 worth of agricultural equipment to 
Zimbabwe in 2001 and continued to make subsequent credit lines to the sector during the 
crisis period.204  
 
More visible Chinese investments in Zimbabwe’s agriculture were made in tobacco 
production. The crop has generally been regarded as Zimbabwe’s ‘golden leaf’ because 
of its historical status as the country’s highest foreign currency earner. In 2005, the two 
countries signed an agreement that would see the expanded tobacco fields for China to 
2500 hectares of land and 10 000 more hectares were offered in a separate agreement the 
following year.205 With these agreements, China has become Zimbabwe’s largest tobacco 
consumer with the crop attracting huge Chinese investments into the agricultural sector. 
Some Zimbabwean analysts however, have raised huge concerns about the implications 
of these tobacco deals. Obert Matahwa laments that the crop has been put as collateral to 
open doors for more credit facilities from China.206 
 
 In 2007, the Chinese government extended a credit facility of US$200 million in support 
of Zimbabwe’s agriculture. The facility was mainly used to acquire farming equipments 
from China which included 1000 tractors, and an assortment of combine harvesters, 
irrigation pumps, disc harrows and planters among others.207 This also saw the extension 
of land given for tobacco production in the country. In August 2007, as noted by 
Matahwa “Approximately 110 000 hectares in the areas surrounding Harare are 
committed to growing tobacco.”208 Although China has vastly invested in the 
Zimbabwe’s agriculture, the emphasis on tobacco certainly shifted attention and 
resources from other crops particularly grain and other food crops whose production 
suffered in the process. Shortages of fuel, electricity and seeds, fertilisers and farming 
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chemicals, all linked to the wider crisis situation continued to hinder the success of 
agriculture in Zimbabwe over the last decade.  
 
Furthermore, despite China’s huge investments in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector, 
general output, including tobacco production fundamentally dropped during the crisis 
period. Obert Matahwa reports that by 2007, Zimbabwe had dropped out of the six 
tobacco exporting countries owing to reduced productivity. 209 Much of this downward 
trend is mainly attributed to the inconveniences and inadequacies of the land reform 
programme. In the face of growing difficulties, the Zimbabwean government is believed 
to have mortgaged the bigger stake of tobacco production to the Chinese for financial 
support.210 For example, in 2007, China promised loan of US$58 million  to the 
Zimbabwean government intended to purchase farming inputs and tools on condition that 
Zimbabwe will deliver 110 000 tonnes of tobacco to China in two years.211 Commenting 
on this arrangement, Matahwa notes that Zimbabwe stands to lose control of one of its 
principal exports in the long run. On the same point, Anthony Hawkins declares that 
“Zimbabwe stands a better chance to pull itself from the economic abyss if it addresses 
its woes without mortgaging future production of its major export resources to the 
Chinese.”212 The major setback in this deal was that it would mean that Zimbabwe would 
have to close its auction flows (at least for two years) if its tobacco output fails to rise to a 
level that would leave a surplus to trade locally after giving the Chinese their share. This 
would potentially deny the Zimbabwean government large sums of money usually gained 
from the auction flows.  
 
3.7.3. Energy Sector 
Chinese capital investments have also been directed to Zimbabwe’s energy sector. The 
cordial relations between the two countries paved arrangements that saw Zimbabwe 
buying electrical equipment on reasonable terms from China. In November 2004, 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), the country’s biggest power utility 
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entered a cooperation deal with a Chinese company, China Aviation Technology Import-
Export Corporation (CATIC) which saw the Zimbabwean power utility receiving 
equipment worth US$110 million213  Furthermore, ZESA also signed a deal worth Z$2, 4 
billion for more equipment from CATIC. In 2006, ZESA acquired electrical equipment 
from China to replace its obsolete infrastructure in the city of Harare.214 Sven 
Schwersensky reports that the deal was made possible through Zimbabwe’s exports of 
tobacco to China.215 The chairman of the Zimbabwe Electricity Distribution Company 
(ZEDC), Sydney Gata, was quoted in a local newspaper saying, “We have done very well 
in the area of non-resource finance for the purchase of power supplies. We already have 
purchased new equipment from China and this was made possible through  the tobacco 
exports venture by ZESA enterprises.”216  
 
The largest energy deal was with China Machine Building International Corporation in 
June 2006 estimated at US$1.3 Billion to mine coal and build two new thermal power 
units at the Hwange thermal plant.217 This was seen as a solution to cut the dependence 
on electricity from neighbouring Mozambique and South Africa. The deal was also 
poised to reduce the country’s power outages. Cooperation on rural electrification was 
also agreed in principle between the two countries.  
 
Despite the various Chinese investments in Zimbabwe’s energy sector, electricity 
shortages persisted throughout the crisis period. The supply of power remains a problem 
to date as the state continues to struggle to meet its electricity consumption demands. 
With the persistent shortages of power in the country, it appears that little has been done 
to honour  the promises and to implement the agreements reached with Chinese 
companies to assist in the country’s power production. The failure to change the situation 
of electricity blackouts since the beginning of the crisis in Zimbabwe has raised huge 
concerns on the commitment and the credibility of China’s interests in the sector. This 
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situation is disheartening to the most Zimbabweans who are constantly told about 
expected positive changes in newspapers news on radio and television without real results 
on the ground.218  
 
3.7.4. Construction and Infrastructural Utilities 
For a long time since independence, China’s construction operators have been very active 
in Zimbabwe’s construction industry. The Chinese were applauded for the construction of 
the National Sports Stadium in the mid-eighties. In 1995, China and the Industrial 
Development Corporation of Zimbabwe launched Sino-Zimbabwe Cement joint company 
in Gweru.219 This marked the joint production of cement for construction projects within 
the country as well as for export to China and in the Southern African region. In order to 
consolidate its role in Zimbabwe’s construction industry, China opened a tile and brick 
factory in 2004.220 Contrary to other sectors that suffered in the deepening crisis, private 
construction in Zimbabwe did not stop. This was apparently due to the fact that the 
industry was largely supported by the diaspora population of Zimbabwe through 
remittances that were partly invested in securing real estates in the home country. In this 
regard, housing construction boomed as the Chinese factories continued supplying inputs. 
 
Construction of public utilities however, came to a halt during the crisis period due to the 
lack of foreign currency in the government treasury. The period under review saw a 
fundamental deterioration of the country’s road networks as tar marks in the cities and 
some highways were often littered with pot-holes due to lack of maintenance.  There was 
apparently less cooperation between China and Zimbabwe in this sector. This is can be 
attributed to the less attractive nature of the road construction business in Zimbabwe as it 
often takes long bureaucratic negotiations with several government departments before a 
comprehensive deal can be reached. In October 2008 however, the Zimbabwe National 
Road Authority purchased road construction equipment worth US$2.6 million from 
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China for use in repairing and maintaining roads throughout the country. 221 The 
equipment, which comprised six graders, six tippers and two water dowser, were 
expected in the country in March 2009.222  
In May 2005, a Chinese company, China Jiangxi Corporation for International Economic 
and Technology Cooperation (CJCIETC) secured a US$145 million tender for the 
construction of the Kunzvi Dam amid allegations that normal tender procedures were not 
followed.223 Grace Kombora and Augustine Mukaro reported that the deal became “the 
second high-profile project to be awarded under a special – and opaque – tendering 
process after the Zupco tender was given to China’s Javesh Shah’s Gift Investments.”224 
After securing the tender, the Chinese allegedly moved quickly with machinery and 
equipment to the sight, demonstrating their readiness to undertake the work before other 
competitors had been replied about the results of their applications.225 Despite these 
developments, it is reported that almost four years on, this investment still has not been 
finalised while irregular water supplies continue in Harare where the dam was earmarked 
for water supply. 
 
Under infrastructural utilities, one can argue that the Chinese managed some strides of 
difference in Zimbabwe. Through bilateral agreements with China, the government 
controlled Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) received fleets of buses on 
several occasions from China. This served to lessen transport problems in the country’s 
urban areas, at least in the short run. In 2005, China delivered about 100 buses for urban 
public transport.226 According to Schwersensky, the timing of this consignment was a 
political move by the government as it coincided with the final weeks of parliamentary 
election campaign.227 The general users of these Chinese imported buses however, 
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complain that the buses often breakdown at alarming regularity with some indicating that 
the buses cannot be relied on for long distance travelling. Several commuters in Harare 
complain that the inefficiency from these buses often cause delays and disruptions 
costing them time and money in various ways.  
 
Still under the transport sector, Chinese companies demonstrated interest to acquire some 
stakes in one of Zimbabwe’s major parastatals, the National Railways of Zimbabwe 
(NRZ). China’s China Northern Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry (NORINCO 
Group) signed an agreement in 2004 to supply and improve rolling stock with NRZ. 228 
More recently Xinhua News reported that Chinese companies have expressed interest in 
two important transport projects in Zimbabwe. The first is concerned with dualising the 
A1 highway from Harare to Zambezi and the second involving rehabilitating the railway 
along the same route from Harare to Chinhoyi and extending it for about 235 kilometres 
to Zambezi to link Zimbabwe and Zambia. It will be interesting to see these ambitions 
coming to implementation and if they do, it will probably represent one of the huge 
Chinese investment projects in Zimbabwe in recent years. The project will also stand to 
benefit the whole Southern African region as road and railway networks are useful in the 
transportation of goods particularly from the ports of South Africa through Zimbabwe 
and to the rest of the region. 
 
Furthermore, Chinese investments were also directed to Zimbabwe’s tourism industry. 
The tourism industry however, suffered a significant overall decline during the crisis 
period as the country grappled with a dented image in its traditionally reliable Western 
markets. In contrast however, Zimbabwe and China signed a tourism agreement on 15 
June 2004 that would facilitate better travelling conditions for Chinese tourists coming to 
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Zimbabwe.229 Despite this deal the tourism industry suffered as the much expected 
Chinese visitors were reported to be small-spenders.230  
A summary of the above mentioned Chinese projects and investments made in different 
sectors of the Zimbabwean economy is presented in Table 4 below.  
 
Table 4: Chinese projects in Zimbabwe 
Sector Projects  
Repayment 
option  
Status 
Agriculture  US$ 58 million facility for provision of 
agricultural equipment (tractors, combine 
harvesters, disc ploughs, harrows, etc). 
Business to business agreement signed 
between Farmers world and a Chinese 
company though guaranteed by the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
Tobacco 
exports to 
China  
Equipment has 
since been 
delivered 
Agricultural 
Technological 
Transfer  
Setting up an Agricultural Demonstration 
Centre just outside Harare 
Improved 
exports to 
China  
Project 
commissioned 
in late May 
2007  
Agriculture  Supply of fertilizer (200000-400000 
tons). Business to Business agreement 
signed between ZFC and a Chinese 
company though with a Government 
guarantee 
Improved 
exports to 
China  
Consignment 
delivered 
though part of 
it was 
condemned as 
unfit for 
Zimbabwean 
soils 
Mining &     
Electricity  
Construction of 3 thermal power stations 
at Hwange Colliery company 
Loan  Project 
commissioned  
Mining  Revival of Mhangura Copper mine. 
Business to Business agreement between 
Zimbabwe Mining Development 
 Project still on 
paper 
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Corporation(ZMDC) and Chinese Aero-
technology Import and Export Company 
(CATIC)  
Railways  Supply of rail equipment  Loan  Project 
commissioned 
Communicati
on  
Supply of telephone equipment to Tel-
One( Business to business agreement)  
Loan  Equipment 
delivered  
Transport  Supply of FAW buses to ZUPCO 
(business to business agreement with 
Reserve Bank guarantee)  
 The buses 
were delivered 
but the 
majority of 
which have 
since are no 
longer 
operating due 
to technical 
faults. 
Energy Construction of thermal power station in 
Dande  
Exchange  Agreement 
signed  
 
Source: AFRODAD, 2007231  
 
 
 
3.8. China-Zimbabwe Trading Relationship 
During the crisis period, Zimbabwe and China also augmented their trading relationship. 
Trade relations between the two countries have been strengthened through high level 
visits by government officials, sharing each other’s experiences in different sectors. 
China has now been variously referred to as Zimbabwe’s second largest trading partner 
after South Africa.232 Despite the repeated plummeting in the value of the country’s local 
currency since 2000, China has continued trading with Zimbabwe in a variety of 
commodities. The recent trading relations between the two countries are reportedly 
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underwritten by China’s appetite for mineral resources and raw materials in 
Zimbabwe.233 In February 2004, trade between China and Zimbabwe was further 
deepened by the signing of an Economic and Technical agreement.234 Part of this 
agreement was the commitment by China to help Zimbabwe improve its tobacco 
production by providing the necessary resources. This agreement was expected to present 
mutual benefits for both countries. The then Zimbabwean Minister of Finance and 
Economic Development, Chris Kuruneri was quoted saying, “We have the land and the 
man power and you (China) have the resources. It’s not a one-way street. We expect to 
mutually benefit.”235 During the same meeting, Minister Kuruneri also reiterated that 
Zimbabwe is endowed with vast amounts of underexploited minerals and encouraged the 
two countries to further their relations in that sector. 
 
Data from the World Trade Atlas indicate that Zimbabwe’s trading relationship with 
China has been on the increase since the mid-1990s. It is reported that bilateral trade 
between the two countries increased from US$52.2 million in 1996 up to US$275.25 
million in 2006 with the peak of US$283.30million recorded in 2005.236 Figure 1 below 
presents the trade trends between China and Zimbabwe since the late 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
233 Hannah Edinger and Christopher Burke: Op cit, p. 18 
234 Xinhua News Agency: Zimbabwe, China Sign Agreement to Strengthen Trade Relations, 21 February 
2004 
235 Ibid 
236 World Trade Atlas, Data collected from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),2007 
67 
 
Figure 1: Zimbabwe’s exports to and imports from China, in US$ millions (1995-
2006) 
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Source: World Trade Atlas (MOFCOM) 
 Much like the trading patterns of China with other African states, bilateral trade between 
China and Zimbabwe has been characterised by the export of raw materials in return for 
manufactured goods (including clothing, textiles and footwear), transport (automobiles, 
busses, tractors and aircraft vehicles), electrical machinery and other equipment.237 
However, contrary to many other countries’ trade profiles with China, the two-way trade 
pattern with Zimbabwe shown in Figure 1 above indicates that trade between the two 
countries has been skewed towards Zimbabwe. This is however, generally unusual that a 
non-oil exporting developing country can export more products to China than it is 
importing. This trend is an indication that Zimbabwe managed to secure a valuable 
market in China for its resources after the withdrawal of the West.  
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Exports from Zimbabwe to China have been dominated by cash crops (tobacco, cotton) 
and minerals particularly nickel and ferroalloys. Tobacco is however the main export 
product to China.238 Nevertheless, there was a general decline in exports from Zimbabwe 
to China during the crisis due to the broad deteriorating economic situation in the 
country. A further decline in agricultural production also resulted to a fall of the main 
export crop from Zimbabwe to China. Tobacco production was also made less attractive 
due to the unfavourable exchange rates and higher input costs during the crisis period. 
Formerly one of Africa’s top producers of flue-cured tobacco, Zimbabwe’s total tobacco 
production declined to 58 million kg in 2006, down from 200 million kilograms in 
2001.239 This was expected to improve in 2008 after China extended a credit facility of 
US$58 million to help boosting Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector particularly tobacco 
production. In 2006, nickel was the second largest export to China at US$ 16.72 million, 
constituting 12% of total exports to Beijing. 240 Both these exports were ranked top in 
Zimbabwe’s trade account with China. Cotton exports stood at US$ 13.93 million in 
2006, contributing the third largest (10.1%) of the export value to China despite dropping 
from the US$18.1 million mark of 2004.241 Ferroalloys which mainly included alloys of 
iron was the fourth largest export standing at US$9.4 and comprising 6.7% of 
Zimbabwe’s exports to China.242 Below (Figure 2) is a diagrammatic illustration of these 
for major exports flows from Zimbabwe to China during the crisis period. 
 
                                                 
238 Ibid, p. 20 
239 Mhango, Yvonne: Zimbabwe: Mid -year gauge - Political reform a prerequisite for economic recovery. 
Standard Bank Research, Economics.  July, 2007 
240 World Trade Atlas, 2007 
241 Ibid 
242 Ibid 
69 
 
Figure 2: Zimbabwe’s top four exports to China, US$ millions (2000-2006) 
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Source: World Trade Atlas 
 
During the crisis period, Zimbabwe also imported huge amounts of finished products 
from China. The period since the late 1990s saw a gradual increase in Chinese imports. It 
is reported that imports from China were generally moderate and tripled in 1997 and 
again in 2004 from previous import levels.243 This comes as a result of a number of loans 
extended to Zimbabwe from China to purchase agricultural equipment and military 
supplies. The diagram below shows the general trend of Zimbabwean imports from China 
for 1996 to 2006. In 2004, Zimbabwe signed a military trade deal which saw the country 
purchasing a number planes, trainer jets and commuter buses from China.244 This greatly 
contributed to a steep rise in the percentage growth of imports from China as shown in 
the graph. 
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Figure 3: Zimbabwe’s imports from China and % growth of imports, millions of 
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In 2006, Zimbabwe also received a line of major imports from China which comprised of 
transmission equipment for radiotelephony and other electrical apparatus for telephony 
communication. 246 Chemical products including insecticides, pest and fertilizers also 
form part of the major imports from China. Throughout the crisis period, Zimbabwe also 
became a destination of huge amounts of Chinese fabric and textile exports. In 2006, 
woven fabric imports from China amounted to US$5.27 million. 247 It is reported that by 
2006, clothing, textiles and footwear imports products had already doubled the 2000 
amounts.248 A total of US$12.04 million worth of clothing, textile and footwear 
merchandise was imported from China in 2006 although this may potentially 
underestimates the actual amount of Chinese exports to Zimbabwe in this industry due to 
a lot of black market trade involved between the two countries. Also, some of the 
Chinese products flooding the Zimbabwean markets have been imported from other 
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countries particularly South Africa and Botswana whose markets that have been highly 
exploited by a large number of Zimbabwean cross-border traders. 
 
3.9. Defence and Military Relations  
Apart from the more acceptable levels of co-operation, Beijing also used military 
engagement as a form of deepening co-operation with Zimbabwe. Through the crisis 
period, China continued to supply arms and military hardware to the Zimbabwean 
government. It is reported that in 2004, the Zimbabwean government purchased US$1 
million worth of AK-47s from China which were allegedly exchanged with ivory. 249 
While the precise details of the acquisition are difficult to ascertain, Permanent Secretary 
of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence, Trust Maphosa accompanied by army 
commander, General Constantine Chiwenga and Air Force of Zimbabwe Chief, Air 
Marshall Perence Shiri, stated during a hearing of the joint Senate and House of 
Assembly Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence and Home Affairs that six K-8 
training jets had already arrived in the country by March 2006 and that the remainder 
were to be delivered by the end of the year.250 Though details were not disclosed, the 
military officials declared that a payment of US$4.6 million had been made to the 
Chinese manufacturers of the aircraft.251 China is also reported to have supplied the 
Zimbabwean military with radar equipment in the same deal. 252 In this regard, China has 
become an increasingly vital source of military equipment to Zimbabwe since the 
implementation of Western military embargoes. 
 
The military continues to play a prominent role in Zimbabwe’s politics. This has been 
seen over time when the military is deployed by the state to deal with suspected 
opposition political activism since the Matabeleland disturbances. For this reason, the 
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high level of cooperation and exchange between the militaries of the two countries during 
the crisis period raised great suspicions about China’s intentions in Zimbabwe. 
 
In essence this level of collaboration rendered the relationship controversial leading to 
suspicions that China was intensifying conflict within the heavily polarized Zimbabwean 
society by cushioning the power base of the ‘undemocratic’ ZANU-PF government.253  
The supply of military hard and software like fighter jets and the technology for jamming 
radio signals and filtering the internet to the Mugabe government became clear examples 
of these feared Chinese intentions in the country. 254 Politically controversial interactions 
as with Zimbabwe enabled the Chinese leadership to further entrench state to state 
relations for long-term strategic influence, especially at a time when the West’s attitude 
to develop co-operation was aligned to political conditionalities. Also, close ties with the 
Zimbabwean government facilitated the entry of Chinese corporations into positions 
which rooted them in the Zimbabwean market which had long been dominated by the 
West.  
  
3.10. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, it has been noted that the relations between China and Zimbabwe can be 
traced back to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Government relations during that time 
were pitched in military and ideological terms. Since Zimbabwe’s independence, 
interaction between the two countries shifted to take a commercial path as has been 
shown in the foregoing discussion. Despite involving some strides of political and 
military exchanges with the Zimbabwean government, the current China-Zimbabwe 
interactions have been centred on economic and technological exchanges. Faced by a 
raging economic and political crisis in the midst of Western isolation, it became 
imperative for the Zimbabwean government to look for other sources of aid and 
investments. This culminated into the adoption of the ‘Look East’ policy to attract allies 
from Asia and the Pacific regions. The implantation of the policy however, eventually 
shifted its focus to China as Beijing presented itself as the best option for both political 
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and economic support to the Harare government. In this background, Zimbabwe’s crisis 
period witnessed the growing of aid, investments from and trade interactions with China. 
The deepening Chinese engagement in Zimbabwe’s various sectors during this time 
however came with varied economic and political impacts on Zimbabwe as will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTS OF CHINA’S INCREASED ENGAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE 
 
4.1. Economic Effects 
 
The invigorated China’s involvement in Zimbabwe in the last decade can be linked to a 
variety of economic events and situations of the crisis period. In 2006, Zimbabwe’s 
Ministry of Industry and International Trade expressed government’s intention to review 
the country’s customs and immigration formalities to facilitate the flow of Asian (mainly 
Chinese) capital into a number of key sectors of its economy. 255 Minister Obert Mpofu 
was quoted in a local newspaper saying,  "We are working on measures to facilitate 
investment flows into Zimbabwe, especially from China and other developing 
countries.”256 These measures involved removing certain bureaucratic formalities to give 
investors convenience and confidence in the country. This was potentially targeted on 
facilitating the smooth flow Chinese capital in Zimbabwe after the realization that China 
had a major role to play in the country’s economy. In the same year, the Zimbabwe 
Investment Centre (ZIC) reported that the total value of Chinese projects in the country 
reached US$530-600 million. China's approved investments for the first half of the year 
amounted to US$ 8.5 million with a total of 68 projects approved by August 2006.257 In 
April 2007 it was reported that 35 Chinese companies are active in the Zimbabwean 
economy. The huge contributions made by China in this regard therefore, became vital in 
sustaining the country’s economy in the absence of Western support.  
 
In another economic development, China and Zimbabwe agreed to further strengthen 
cooperation though a Joint Commission which currently meets on biannual basis to 
discuss and deliberate trade relations between the two governments. The Joint 
Commission has been functional in promoting joint venture agreements and FDI inflow 
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into a number of Zimbabwe’s key economic sectors. In this regard, Chinese investment 
moved in to fill the gaps which other investors regarded as too risky to pursue.258 Despite 
the overwhelming economic situation, the Zimbabwean government was able to carry on 
with business throughout the crisis period. On this basis, it can be noted that China threw 
a lifeline into the disintegrating Zimbabwean economy, preventing its complete collapse 
and helped the ZANU-PF government to survive conditions which highly threatened its 
existence.  
 
Sino-Zimbabwe relations grew apace with Zimbabwe’s isolation by its traditional aid and 
trading partners from the West. The withdrawal of the West inevitably drove the Mugabe 
administration to seek strong economic partnerships with Asian countries. This brought 
forth the adoption of the ‘Look East” policy mainly to attract Asian investors. In the 
process, Zimbabwe established strong ties with China and attracted significant financial 
support as well as aid and investments which became vital in sustaining the economy in 
the face of Western sanctions. In this relationship, China behaved in a purely realist 
manner by defying international calls on Zimbabwe’s isolation for its human rights 
record. While it was pragmatic for the Zimbabwean government to snub the West and 
pursue new economic spheres and to strengthen its ties with countries of the east, some 
observers believed that the ‘Look East’ policy was just a political slogan stemming from 
Mugabe’s troubles with the West.259 Former Information and Publicity Minister, Jonathan 
Moyo, discredited the policy when he said: “There is no such policy. It’s a political 
slogan. It’s typical of the ZANU PF leadership to parade slogan as policies.”260 Whether 
the policy was a viable strategy or a slogan is largely subjective however, it is important 
to note that its implementation greatly helped to solicit economic support from Asian 
countries particularly China. The changes in trade volumes between China and 
Zimbabwe during the crisis period are evidence to this effect. 
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Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s trade profile with China displays that Beijing’s interest in the 
country is not limited to resources, but it also regards Zimbabwe as a potential market for 
its manufactured and industrial goods. Like many other African countries, Zimbabwe has 
been infested with enormous quantities of Chinese manufactured products such as 
clothing, shoes, textiles, toys, plastics, television and radio sets, and other electrical 
appliances. These goods are significantly cheaper compared to the locally produced 
goods. The continual penetration of cheap Chinese products in the local market received 
numerous criticisms from both consumers and competing industries in Zimbabwe. For 
instance, Zimbabweans complain bitterly that Chinese products sold in their markets are 
generally shoddy and cannot be trusted for safety. 261  
 
In a way to express their displeasure, Zimbabweans coined the pejorative term ‘zhing-
zhongs’ in reference to various Chinese products in the local market. According to Eldred 
Masunungure, such goods, referred to by locals as “zhing-zhongs” are generally 
considered to be of lower quality and sub-standard, apparently not acceptable in high 
income Western markets.262 In Zimbabwe, the derogatory term “zhing-zhong” however, 
has not only been limited to the Chinese products, but also to Chinese nationals staying 
and working in the country. This is reportedly affecting other Asian people often 
mistaken as Chinese particularly the Japanese and the Koreans staying in Zimbabwe.263 
Where there is difficulty in distinguishing Chinese nationals from Asians of other 
countries looking closely as the Chinese, they are often all lumped as “zhing-zhongs” in 
the Zimbabwean circles. This can be seen as a subtle form of xenophobia.  This concurs 
with Michael Wines’ remarks that, “the resentment of the Chinese is not only 
widespread, it’s deeply rooted…” in the Zimbabwean population. 264  
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Before the crisis, Zimbabwe used to pride itself with an active manufacturing sector, 
contributing a significant share of the country’s  GDP and supplying manufactured goods 
such as textiles, clothing and light electrical appliances to its sub-Saharan neighbours. 
However, in light of the political and economic crisis the manufacturing sector 
deteriorated as most of its workforce was lost to the diaspora. Industrial collapse was 
spurred by a shortage of inputs, raw material imports and a lack of foreign exchange. 
Chinese competition further undercut these industries, most significantly in the clothing 
and footwear industries, aggravating unemployment and poverty. An increasing number 
of Chinese small entrepreneurs infiltrating the trading community since the 
implementation of the “Look East” policy have subjected local retailers to stiff 
competition in the country’s markets.265 For instance, Tendayi Mugiyo, who runs a 
clothing retail in Harare put forward his frustration when he said that: “We really have a 
problem with the Chinese, they bring in cheap and yet poor quality goods thereby putting 
our local companies out of business.”266  
 
4.2. China’s Diplomatic Support  
 
Throughout the crisis period, China provided diplomatic support to the Zimbabwean 
government, refusing to join international chastisement based on its human rights record. 
China’s diplomatic support was vital in preventing United Nations sanctions against 
Zimbabwe in 2005 after the government embarked on ‘Operation Murambatsvina” in the 
country’s cities.267 In addition, in July 2008, after the disputed presidential elections, the 
British and the U.S governments sort the support of the UN Security Council members 
for punitive measures on Zimbabwe to apply pressure on Robert Mugabe’s government 
for political and economic reforms. Again, China and Russia vetoed the resolution and 
backed Zimbabwe against suspension from the United Nations. Explaining China’s 
position on the resolution, China’s ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya said, “The 
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development of the situation in Zimbabwe until now has not exceeded the context of 
domestic affairs…It will unavoidably interfere with the negotiation process.”268 This 
political support indeed boosted the Mugabe administration against widespread criticism 
for the violence witnessed in the country during the campaigns for the presidential run-
off elections. China’s support could have also bolstered ZANU-PF’s position in the 
negotiations for the unity government.  
 
4.3. The military relationship and Zimbabwe’s political situation 
Military trading is one of the most contentious areas in China’s recent relations with 
Zimbabwe. China’s behaviour with military technology especially among developing 
countries generates controversial concerns over its commitment to internationally 
acclaimed values of peace and security.  China’s military alliance with Zimbabwe in the 
face Western arms embargoes features prominently in this controversy, notably at a time 
when the country has earned ‘pariah’ status from its Western critics.269  
 
While it was financially costly for Zimbabwe, the trade in weapons posed major concerns 
to the country’s political stability. For instance, Zimbabwe’s imports of military hardware 
in 2004 raised immense suspicion about their intended use in a country neither at war nor 
facing any imminent military threat.270 During that time, Zimbabwe was faced by 
challenges of a highly fragile domestic political environment and a polarised society in 
the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections.271 Such a situation raised calls by the 
international community for China to promote processes free and fair elections and to 
ensure political stability in the country. Hence, the supply of weapons to Zimbabwe 
effectively undermined this process in that the state increasingly became authoritarian, 
threatening to use various means at its disposal (including military) to suppress 
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opposition. 272 Commenting on China’s influence on Zimbabwe’s 2005 parliamentary 
elections, an undisclosed Western diplomat was quoted in the local media saying, “I find 
it hard to believe the Chinese would push hard for free and fair elections - it's not the 
standard they're known for.”273 Much of the criticism on Chinese weapons was largely 
premised on the belief that the military acquisitions were used to intimidate the 
Zimbabwean population hence postponing the quest for democratic transition in the 
country. 274 
 
Furthermore, controversy and tension about military exchanges between the two 
countries increased in 2008 when a Chinese ship was denied access to deliver a 
consignment of arms destined for Zimbabwe through South African. This happened at the 
height of the political crisis after the March 29 disputed presidential election results 
which evoked key interests from human rights groups, civic unions as well as many other 
stakeholders around the globe. Human rights advocates demonstrated their resistance to 
the weapons transfer in diverse ways. The most remarkably was the demonstration by a 
union of South African dockers who refused to offload the arms shipment at the Durban 
port. Again, China’s intentions and commitment to political stability in Zimbabwe came 
to question in this incident. Contemplating the authoritarian predisposition obtaining in 
the country since 2000 epitomized by escalating violence, intimidation, political 
repression and human rights violations, many commentators believed that the Chinese 
weapons imports were certainly going be used by the ruling party for pressurizing voters 
in the presidential run-off elections.275 Also, controversy largely emerged on the intention 
of importing military hardware at a critical time when the country’s population was living 
under various insecurities which did not require military intervention. 
 
Much to the surprise of human rights advocates and the international community, the 
above mentioned arms shipment issue appeared less important to both the Chinese and 
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the Zimbabwean governments. Instead, the Chinese government portrayed its arms sale 
as a prudent and responsible transaction in line with the principle of state sovereignty, 
hence not violating any rights, peace or the stability of Zimbabwe.276 In order to 
demonstrate China’s influence on Zimbabwe’s volatile political situation at that time, 
most media reports, particularly in the West juxtaposed presentations about China’s 
involvements in the country with coverage of violence and political instability. For 
example, writing about the spread of violence in the aftermath of the 2008 joint election,  
Celia Dugger reported in the New York Times that, “… that 10,000 children had been 
displaced by violence, scores had been beaten and some schools had been taken over by 
pro-government forces and turned into centres of torture.”277 Such reports were damaging 
to China’s reputation and evoked further international scrutiny on its involvement in 
Zimbabwe.  In response to this and other media reports criticising China’s arms supply in 
Zimbabwe, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, at a press briefing in 
Beijing reiterated that the shipment was part of ‘normal military trade contract’ between 
Zimbabwe and China that had been signed in the previous year (2007), therefore, had no 
relevance to Zimbabwe’s 2008 political situation. 278 At the same time, China also called 
on the international community to refrain from politicising the issue. 
 
Linked to the above discussion of China’s military exports to Zimbabwe is the issue of 
financing a culture of political authoritarianism in the country. Writing about China’s 
conduct in Africa in general, Joshua Kurlantizick and Perry Link put forward that China 
seems to be perpetrating resilient and sophisticated authoritarianism in the region. 279 
Despite the military equipment, the authoritarian nature of the Zimbabwean government 
was also aided by the radio jamming devices obtained from China. The equipment was 
useful for preventing independent stations from counter-balancing state controlled media 
particularly during elections. In this regard, Orbert Matahwa notes that, “Chinese radio-
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jamming equipment helped to silence anti-government radio stations during the 2005 
elections.”280 During that time, independent stations such as Short Wave Radio Africa 
and International Broadcasting Bureau were blocked from Zimbabwe’s air waves for 
spreading anti-government news and commentary to the world.281 Considering these 
developments, one can strongly argue that China’s support to the Zimbabwean 
government helped to frustrate processes of democratic transition in the country in the 
crisis period. 
 
During the Zimbabwean crisis, key elements to China’s stance regarding the human 
rights in general were also exposed. In China’s perspective, human rights are construed 
as an element of economic development that can be sacrificed in certain circumstances 
when they are seen as blocking the broader economic and political objectives of the 
state.282 On this point, He Wenping – then director of the African Studies Section at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing reiterated China’s practical approach in 
international affairs saying that, “We [China] don’t believe that human rights should 
stand above sovereignty… We have a different view on this and African countries share 
our view.”283 Indeed, this corresponds with China’s realist approach in its interactions 
with African countries.  Despite the widespread complains about political violence and 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe, China continued to relate with the state on 
pragmatic commercial basis. Liu Guijin, China’s Special Envoy on African Affairs 
underscored Beijing’s resistance to imposing international sanctions in response to 
Zimbabwe’s alleged vio lations of human rights when he said that, “We don’t attach 
political conditions [to aid]. We have to realise the political and economic environments 
are not ideal. But we don’t have to wait for everything to be satisfactory or human rights 
to be perfect.”284 Consequently, the democratic deficiency in the country widened as 
China continued with its non- interference policy in Zimbabwe’s domestic affairs. 
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4.4. The China Model in Zimbabwe 
Rowan Callick argues that leaders of developing counties particularly in Africa are 
“admiring and emulating what might be called the China Model.”285 Callick explains that 
the ‘China Model’ has got two components that are particularly attractive to African 
states: 
The first is to copy successful elements of liberal economic policy by 
opening up much of the economy to foreign and domestic investment, 
allowing labour flexibility, keeping the tax and regulatory burden low, and 
creating a first-class infrastructure through a combination of private sector 
and state spending. The second part is to permit the ruling party to retain a 
firm grip on government, the courts, the army, the internal security 
apparatus, and the free flow of information. A shorthand way to describe 
the model is: economic freedom plus political repression. 286  
 
While the first set of components may not be entirely applicable to Zimbabwe, it has 
some elements that were adopted during the crisis period. In light of Western isolation, 
the Zimbabwean government opened up much of its economy to Asian investors 
attracting huge amounts of aid and capital from China.  The second set of elements 
according to Callick’s model appeared to be mostly attractive to the Zimbabwean 
government in the time under review.  The crisis period in Zimbabwe saw the 
centralisation of power in the ruling government which exercised maximum control on 
almost all the state institutions including the judiciary, the army, civil service, police and 
other security services. The Zimbabwean media was also highly censored as the state sort 
to control public media criticism on its activities. While this model might have worked in 
Zimbabwe, at least by augmenting the means used by the Mugabe administration to retain 
power, it proved difficult to sustain over time as the political and economic situation in 
the country worsened. As the crisis deepened in 2008, China’s support proved to be 
insufficient to keep the Zimbabwean economy afloat. Hence, it became imperative for the 
state officials to seek assistance from other global partners from the West. Certainly, this 
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might have also contributed to the pressure which pushed the ZANU-PF government to 
enter into a unity government with the MDC, surrendering a degree of its political 
authority which had been regarded as inconceivable for a long time. 
 
While the talk of democracy has been sweeping over the African continent in recent 
years, some experts believe that China is implanting its blend of ‘free-market 
dictatorship’, particularly by supporting African leaders reluctant to turn over power 
through democratic processes. This system closely relates to the political environment 
that prevailed in Zimbabwe during the crisis period. On this trend, Chris Maroleng said, 
“We might see the Chinese political system appealing to a lot of states whose elites and 
regimes are more in line with that sort of thinking.”287 For Zimbabwe, Maroleng 
maintained that, “It's really a conflict of two systems, one based on regime security and 
the other, almost Western, which talks of human security - good governance and human 
rights.”288 During the crisis period, Zimbabwe turned out to have adopted certain traits of 
this system. Zimbabwe’s friendship with China turned to grants, loan and investments 
that the Harare government was unable to find elsewhere. In the process, China 
entrenched its policies (both political and economic) in the Zimbabwean system. While 
strengthening its influence on Zimbabwe, China continually refrained from commenting 
on its partner’s human rights practices. On this point, it became clear that China-
Zimbabwe relations cont inued to follow a pragmatic approach, disregarding international 
calls to promote human rights in their activities. In this regard, one can strongly argue 
that China’s support enabled the Zimbabwean government to snub Western demands for 
democratic political and economic reforms during the period under review. 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it came out that some of Chinese support given to 
Zimbabwe was often attached to indirect conditionalities. This fulfils one of the realists’ 
perceptions of states’ interactions which say that the world of international relations 
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offers nothing for free.289 The Chinese aid was secured mainly by pledging some of the 
country’s resource exports to the Beijing government. In this regard, Obert Matahwa 
supports that China’s loans were given on commodity-based security transactions in 
which the repayment was done through giving a certain amount of goods or resources to 
China.290 For example, Zimbabwe’s tobacco, ivory and mineral resources played a crucial 
role in securing military acquisitions from China. Consequently, Matahwa noted that, 
“the Zimbabwean government unreservedly accepted assistance from China … in return 
for ceding control of certain minerals or agricultural crops to the Chinese.”291  For this 
reason, Matahwa went on to argue that Zimbabwe certainly paid a high price for its 
government’s desire for cheap foreign loans from the so called ‘friendly’ countries like 
China.292 In support of this view, University of Zimbabwe economist Anthony Hawkins 
commented that, “Zimbabwe is ultimately the loser in this case because the country has 
to forgo future foreign currency earnings because of this barter system.”293 
 
4.5. Zimbabwean perspectives on China’s involvement in the country 
It has been reported that the Chinese population has been rapidly increasing in recent 
years. By July 2009, it was reported that there were approximately ten thousand Chinese 
nationals living in Zimbabwe with half of this number owning businesses in Harare and 
other cities in the country. 294 Owing to this, Zimbabweans complain about lost business 
opportunities given to the Chinese. A report by Michael Wines suggests that the Chinese 
have allegedly been given special treatment by the Zimbabwean government in business 
transactions. Michael Wiles reports that the Chinese flocked into Zimbabwe in 2005 to 
occupy stores and flea markets in places where local traders had been evicted during 
‘Operation Murambatsvina.’295 This phenomenon also attracted criticism from various 
stakeholders in Zimbabwe. Morgan Tsvangirai, was quoted in the media complaining 
about the lost opportunities for locals when he said: “The country has been mortgaged to 
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the Chinese, How can we violently remove Zimbabweans from our flea markets to make 
way for the Chinese? The majority of Zimbabweans depend on informal trade to feed, 
clothe and educate their families.”296 In addition to this, traders in Zimbabwe complain 
about China’s supply of comparatively cheap and low-quality Chinese goods to an extent 
where some believe that China is using the country as one of its dumping grounds for its 
poor manufactures.297 
 
Although the effects from the flooding of Chinese products were almost uniform to all 
consumers, some analysts argue that profound consequences are realized by women who 
form the majority of consumers for such goods in Zimbabwe. 298 A survey carried out by 
Charity Manyeruke on the impacts of Chinese products on Zimbabwean Women in 
Harare revealed that most women had deep reservations in almost all the products sold in 
Chinese shops.299 While some women expressed their appreciation of Chinese products 
because of their affordability, the majority complained of poor quality stating that they 
fade and depreciate at a quicker rate than local products. This concern was expressed on 
women’s clothing of all types including, footwear and hair products. 
 
In Manyeruke’s survey, women in the high density areas of the city also expressed 
differing views about Chinese products. Many have alluded to the fact that while Chinese 
goods are comparatively cheap at face value, they become expensive in the long run since 
one has to get more of the same product for cover because of their poor quality. In the up-
market suburbs such as Borrowdale in Harare, Manyeruke noted that “Well- to-do women 
expressed their total displeasure at the Chinese products because of their poor quality.”300 
These women also voiced their concern that there was a possibility of China dumping its 
poor quality goods into the country citing that goods exported to other countries such as 
neighbouring South Africa were of better quality than the once shipped directly into 
Zimbabwe.301 
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Looking at the involvements of China in Zimbabwe during the crisis, one can argue that 
China’s increased interests in the country are not focused exclusively on the acquisition 
of natural resources. While many Zimbabweans complained of China dumping cheap and 
substandard commodities in local markets, the low prices for these goods certainly bailed 
out poor locals against skyrocketing inflation that would have subjected them to more 
suffering. Nevertheless, the opportunity costs of having such imported commodities on 
the market seem to be higher than the benefits. At micro- level, the Chinese enterprises 
quickly supplanted small scale retailers and local manufacturers in the country as they 
were subjected to stiff competition, effectively pushing them out of business. Moreover, 
local operators also faced strict price controls from the government, restrictions that were 
not economically viable in that they had to sell their products at prices far below the 
production cost. Faced with these difficulties most local operators opted to close down 
their businesses or downsize operations. This contributed to the retrenchment of large 
numbers of workers in various industries, hence aggravating unemployment in the 
country. 
 
On another note, Zimbabwe’s business community was generally wary of opportunistic 
exploitation of the country by China. Specifically, small entrepreneurs perceive China as 
chasing the country’s resources and taking over their business opportunities.302  There is 
concern that the current relationship between the two governments is more convenient to 
China and skewed against Zimbabwe.303 Given that the current Chinese engagement in 
Zimbabwe is predominantly commercial, it appears tha t the Mugabe administration 
downplayed the risks of China’s policy on the country’s small enterprise businesses. On 
this point Zimbabwe’s exiled businessman, Mutumwa Mawere noted that,  
 
The Chinese maybe a different breed of capitalists with the backing of 
their government …and yet they are no different from any Western 
capitalists. Their advantage is that their former communist government 
                                                 
302 Blessing Karumbidza: Op cit, p. 95 
303 Ibid, p. 86 
87 
 
helped in financing the liberation project of Africa but the China of today 
may not have anything to do with the China that African leaders seem to 
want to embrace.304   
 
On a more positive note, China has also been involved in some social responsibility 
initiatives to help certain sections of the Zimbabwean communities. In August 2008, 
seven Chinese firms launched a multi-million dollar Care Action programme to help 
more than 3 000 physically-challenged people and those infected and affected by HIV 
and Aids in Zimbabwe.305 Speaking at the launch of the programme, Chinese 
Ambassador to Zimbabwe Mr Yuan Nansheng said, "The Care Action programme is 
designed as a long-term project to assist Zimbabwe. A total of seven companies have 
pledged to assist in orphanage homes as well as schools in the country as a way of giving 
back to the community."306 At that time, the Chinese companies involved were - 
Sinosteel Zimbabwe, Tianze Tobacco, Sino-Africa Nickels, China Jiangxi Corporation, 
Huawei Technologies, Zimbabwe International Travel and Tourism and Connick 
Investments.307 However, more companies were expected to join as the programme was 
attractive to Chinese companies willing to give back to the Zimbabwean society. Mr 
Yuan explained that the programme was a further step by the Chinese government in 
implementing its China-Africa co-operation policy where Chinese companies undertake 
to respond to the urgent need of assistance as part of their social responsibility. On the 
occasion, the ambassador further promised that the implementation of the programme 
would be complemented by official financial assistance from the Chinese Government.308 
In addition, China also responded positively to the urgent need for medical assistance 
during the cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe. China pledged $500,000 worth of vaccines to 
assist Zimbabwe in controlling the cholera epidemic. These are some of the clear 
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demonstrations of China’s contributions in ameliorating the effects of the Zimbabwean 
crisis.  
 
Although China’s support was instrumental in lessening the stresses of the crisis 
especially for the government, it also came out in the research that China’s involvement 
could not rescue the state and the people from poverty, hunger, disease and a ravaging 
economic meltdown. Despite increased China’s engagement, macro-economic indicators 
revealed that the economy plummeted to shocking levels during the crisis. By July 2008, 
the GDP growth rate had fallen to negative (-) 6.1 percent, with external debt reaching an 
estimated US$4.876 billion. 309 Moreover, inflation reached 2.79 quintillion in October 
2008 as the exchange rate came to US$1: Z$1 trillion, which means 1 trillion 
Zimbabwean dollars were required to buy US$1.310 Around the same time, 
unemployment in Zimbabwe reached 95 percent of the total population, with 85 percent 
of the population living below the Poverty Datum Line.311 Moreover, diseases increased 
with rising cases of malaria, HIV/AIDS and other infirmities. The cholera epidemic also 
took its toll on the country’s tragic health sector as public clinics and hospitals were 
either closed or non-functioning. Resultantly, Zimbabwe was ranked 151 out of 177 in 
the UNDP Human Development Index. 312  Zimbabwe’s education system also came to 
the verge of collapsing during the crisis period despite touted Chinese investments in the 
sector. About 95 percent of all teachers in the public sector were reported to have aborted 
their duties by September 2008 as some went to take menial jobs in South Africa and 
Botswana.313  
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4.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the foregoing discussion reveals the economic and political effects of 
China’s deepening involvement in Zimbabwe. It came out that closed interactions 
between the two countries during the crisis period presented various challenges and 
controversies in different sections of the Zimbabwean society. Different reactions 
emanating from the influx of Chinese products in the Zimbabwean markets have been 
discussed showing deep resentments among the country’s consumers. Serious complains 
stemmed from the quality of Chinese products in the Zimbabwean markets which are 
reportedly shoddy and poor as compared to local products. Cheap Chinese imports are 
also blamed for supplanting small and emerging industries in Zimbabwe. The inflow of 
Chinese nationals in the country also caused huge complains notably, of preferential 
treatment by the Zimbabwean government in business deals and opportunities at the 
expense of local citizens.  
 
Fundamental and perhaps most controversial concerns about China’s involvement in 
Zimbabwe was its unwillingness to comment on the worsening political situation in the 
country. China’s unwavering support to the Zimbabwean government during the crisis 
was variously presented as propagating and sustaining authoritarian governance in 
Zimbabwe. In particular, China’s continual supply of arms to the Mugabe government in 
the midst of Western arms embargos, and at time when Zimbabwe’s political landscape 
was deteriorating compounded these fears. As a result, China’s close engagement with 
the Mugabe administration has been ostensibly blamed for delaying democratic 
development in Zimbabwe. Despite the different perspectives by the Zimbabwean society 
on China’s involvement in the country, the Mugabe government however, praised the 
Chinese for providing aid, loans and diplomatic support which was important to a greater 
extent in evading the wrath of Western sanctions during the crisis period.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study set out to explore the economic and political impacts of the increased Chinese 
engagements in the Zimbabwean crisis. The main intention was to understand China’s 
effects on Zimbabwe’s economic and political landscape since the year 2000, and 
assessing the extent of the challenges and opportunities of this close engagement for 
Zimbabwe. China’s interactions with Zimbabwe were examined, including China’s 
investments in various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy during the crisis period.  
 
The research provided a background of the ‘crisis’, outlining the elements and causes 
which explain the situation. It showed that since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe underwent 
major economic and political challenges as a result of a combination of different factors. 
Among others, the breakdown of the social contract, bad government policies, the land 
reform and escalating violence collectively contributed to the situation presented as the 
Zimbabwean crisis. The coalescence of these factors led to the deep implosion of 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political landscape as discussed in the different manifestations 
of the crisis situation. The deteriorating Zimbabwean situation triggered widespread 
criticism from states and various organisations from the West. The United States and 
Britain led a campaign in the Western governments to isolate and impose targeted 
sanctions on the Mugabe administration. These sanctions precluded ZANU-PF’s top 
officials from travelling and conducting official business with their Western counterparts. 
This culminated to the withdrawal of credit facilities, aid and investment interests from 
Zimbabwe’s traditional partners, compounding the problems that the country was facing. 
Nevertheless, China fervently stood by the Zimbabwean government and refused to put 
pressure for political and economic reforms on the basis of non-interferences in its 
partners’ domestic affairs. Much to the frustration of the West, China increased its 
interests in Zimbabwe with numerous economic and political engagements as well as 
multilateral diplomatic support particularly in the United Nations. 
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The study indicated that China’s engagement in Zimbabwe has a long history which goes 
back to the Beijing’s support of ZANU during the liberation struggle. The early 
interactions between the two countries were largely ideological, based on the aim to 
challenge Western imperialism and the quest by the Chinese Communist Party to 
propagate communism in Africa and to undermine Soviet influence in Zimbabwe. 
Although relations between the two countries shifted to an economic partnership after 
Zimbabwe’s dependence, a more embedded pragmatic interaction took place at the turn 
of the century. The relationship grew tremendously in the last decade as China increased 
its stakes in Zimbabwe after the Western withdrawal from the country.  
 
In addition, an examination of China’s relations with Zimbabwe during the crisis period 
revealed growing tensions between China’s national economic interests and its increasing 
responsibilities and obligations in the international system. However, China did not allow 
normative issues such as good governance and human rights violations to affect its 
relationship with Zimbabwe. In both governments’ policies, the pursuit of national 
interest prevailed over the acclaimed international obligations. In this relationship, China 
was guided by its quest for natural resources and markets to augment its economic clout 
while the Zimbabwean government was guide by the need for political survival and 
economic support after Western disengagement from the country. 314 Put in other words, 
China saw Zimbabwe as a rich source of minerals and other natural resources as well as a 
suitable destination of its manufactured exports while Zimbabwe regarded China as an 
alternative source of political and economic support in the face of Western isolation.  
 
Nevertheless, China’s close relations with President Mugabe’s administration remained 
contradictory to international expectations of promoting good governance, democracy 
and human rights. In the research it came out that China’s relations with Zimbabwe are 
laden with serious ethical and moral irregularities that expose China to be shrewd, selfish 
and greedy state as it seems to prioritise its economic interests over peoples’ rights in its 
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dealings with the Zimbabwean government.315 China’s transactions with the Zimbabwean 
government particularly the supply of arms and radio jamming equipment was widely 
blamed for precipitating authoritarian governance in the country. Moreover, the 
relationship between the two countries during the Zimbabwean crisis presents China’s 
imperial tenacity however, with limited moral responsibility. China’s reluctance to speak 
out on Zimbabwe’s human rights record solely on the basis of sovereignty and non-
interference raises significant reservations on its commitment to the respected values of 
contemporary international relations.   
 
In a continual demonstration of its realist approach towards Zimbabwe, China continues 
to support the country despite the uncertainty emanating from inclusive government 
which now includes the MDC - formers critics of China’s involvement in the crisis. 
China aims to maintain its pragmatic partnership with Zimbabwe despite fundamental 
changes in its political and administrative structures. After the formation of the unity 
government, China extended a credit line of US$950 million to Zimbabwe for economic 
recovery. 316 In this venture however, China’s contribution almost double the US$500 
million provided by the United States and the European Union. 317 The Chinese loan is 
however, believed to be a scheme to reinforce strategic partnerships with the inclusive 
administration to protect Chinese investments in the country from rigorous government 
regulation. 318 
 
Despite China’s continued support to the inclusive government, there still remains 
scepticism about its capitalist tendencies in the country. In December 2009, Obert Gutu, 
an MDC Senator was quoted saying, “Modern-day China is a capitalist nation. The 
majority of its corporations may be state-owned, but they are fiercely capitalistic in both 
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their mode of production and marketing. They are first and foremost, profit-driven.”319 In 
this regard, it therefore means that there is need for Zimbabwe to enter into well-  
coordinated interactions with China in order to realised greater benefits from the 
partnership. On this note, Gutu recommends that, “The clarion call for Zimbabwe and the 
rest of Africa should be to seek to develop and sustain a win-win economic relationship 
with China by having a regional master plan.”320  
 
This study also showed that China was able to use its close ties with Zimbabwe as a 
milestone for its own political and economic objectives. Politically, the Zimbabwean case 
presented China with a great opportunity to demonstrate its political muscle especially in 
the United Nations Security Council. China’s capacity to veto proposed UN sanctions on 
Zimbabwe was a clear demonstration of its power in influencing major policy decision in 
the international system. Economically China stepped in to fill the void left by the West 
in Zimbabwe. In this regard, China has been able to tap into the Zimbabwe’s resources on 
its own terms and to enter into the country’s markets which had long been dominated by 
the West. 
 
As revealed in the study, the gains of China’s embedded involvement for Zimbabwe, 
though limited and countable, still explain why China has been widely received 
especially by the country’s authorities. As revealed in the foregoing discussion, China 
increased its stakes in Zimbabwe’s agriculture, energy, mining, construction and 
infrastructural sectors during the crisis period. With regard to its various forms of 
economic and diplomatic support to Zimbabwe, one can strongly argue that China bailed 
out President Mugabe’s government to resist Western sanctions.  It is on this basis that 
Political Scientist and University of Zimbabwe lecturer, Simon Badza referring to the 
Mugabe administration in December 2008 argued that, “Had there not been a power like 
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China which threatens to be the next superpower to parallel with the United States … 
Zimbabwe by now would have been part of history.”321  
 
The study also demonstrated that China’s support to Zimbabwe during the crisis was 
insufficient to address the challenges faced by the country’s population. In general, the 
ordinary Zimbabwean citizenry became poor as the crisis continued despite China’s 
invigorated support to the country. The influx of Chinese commodities supplanted locally 
produced products in the market, hence putting both local manufactures and traders out of 
business. Most businesses were effectively forced to either close or scale down 
operations. This aggravated the peoples’ suffering as most lost their jobs and their 
sources of income in the face of a crumbling economy. In addition, China’s investments 
and support in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector was not enough to boost food production. 
Rather, food shortages continued as investments were channelled towards tobacco and 
cotton which were on high demand in the Chinese markets. This subjected the greater 
population of Zimbabwe to food shortages with relatively 5.5 million Zimbabweans 
reportedly in need of emergency food assistance in December 2008.322 
 
Overall, the events and experiences of Zimbabwe in the last decade presented a lucid test 
of Africa’s commitment to the recent internationally avowed norms and values, that is, 
human rights and good governance. They also provided a test of the sensitivity of China, 
the Western countries as well as the wider international community to humanitarian 
issues. The decline of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic sectors and the deterioration of the 
country’s political landscape happened in full view of China, SADC, the African Union, 
and more critically the wider international community. It was clear that all these parties 
were fully aware of the detrimental consequences of the deepening crisis on the country’s 
general population. Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crisis persisted as 
stakeholders adopted policies that proved inadequate to rescue the situation. Apparently,  
the ‘‘Look East’ policy’ by the Zimbabwean government, ‘increased pragmatic 
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engagement with non- interference in domestic affairs by the Chinese government, ‘non-
interference and dialogue’ by SADC and the African Union as well as ‘isolation and 
sanctions’ by the West could not save Zimbabwe from a political and economic downfall. 
It therefore, follows that China’s invigorated involvement did not make fundamental 
positive changes in the country’s economic and political landscape dur ing the crisis 
period.  
 
In the light of the above discussion, an important observation for this study is that 
China’s engagement with Zimbabwe is purely on commercial basis. China seeks to 
secure a constant supply of resources while at the same time creating a reliable market for 
its products in the country.  In order to maintain its commercial interests in the country, 
China offered diplomatic support to the Zimbabwean government by opposing UN 
proposed sanctions on the country. The study also indicates that China’s investment 
interests in Zimbabwe can be important in boosting the rebuilding of the country’s 
economy. However, it requires great commitment for the Zimbabwean authorities to 
strategically channel the Chinese financial resources into projects that will increase 
productivity in different sectors of the country’s economy. Meanwhile, the rebuilding of 
Zimbabwe’s economy goes beyond China’s support. It is therefore, vital for the inclusive 
government to restore the country’s international image so as to attract other partners for 
aid, trade and investments.  
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